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Longstanding debates over the allocation of foreign affairs power between Congress 
and the President have reached a stalemate.  Wherever the formal line between Congress 
and the President’s powers is drawn, it is well established that, as a functional matter, 
even in times of great discord between the two branches, the President wields immense 
power when he acts in the name of foreign policy or national security.    
And yet, while scholarship focuses on the accretion of power in the presidency, 
presidential primacy is not the end of the story.  The fact that the President usually 
“wins” in foreign affairs does not mean that the position the President ultimately chooses 
to take is preordained.  Questions of foreign policy and national security engage diverse 
components of the executive branch bureaucracy, which have overlapping jurisdictions and 
often conflicting biases and priorities.  And yet they must arrive at one executive branch 
position.  Thus the process of decisionmaking, the weight accorded the position of any 
given decisionmaker, the context in which the decision is made—together these shape the 
ultimate position the President takes. 
This Article explores and critiques the foreign policy role Congress can—and does—
play in structuring and rearranging the relative powers of those internal actors, and the 
processes they take to reach their decisions, in order to influence and even direct the 
President’s ultimate position.  Having yielded much of the ground on substance, Congress 
has an opportunity for a second bite at the apple, and may influence the policy directions 
of the presidency by manipulating its internal workings.  There are risks to deploying 
“process controls,” as I term these measures, in lieu of direct substantive engagement, but 
I argue that Congress can and should use these tools more instrumentally to influence the 
course of foreign policy in areas where it is otherwise unlikely to assert itself as a coequal 
branch and necessary check on presidential power. 
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Longstanding debates over the allocation of foreign affairs power 
between Congress and the President have reached a stalemate.  Wherever 
the formal line between Congress and the President’s powers is drawn, it is 
well established that, as a functional matter, even in times of great discord 
between the two branches, the President wields immense power when he 
acts in the name of foreign policy or national security.    
But presidential primacy is not the end of the story.  While the 
President might wield far-reaching control over the nation’s foreign affairs 
and national security policies, Congress can shape the President’s position, 
and thus the foreign policy of the United States, without necessarily 
mandating the substance of that policy itself. 
This Article explores and critiques the foreign policy role Congress 
can—and does—play through structuring and rearranging the relative 
powers of internal executive branch actors, and the processes they take to 
reach their decisions, in order to influence and even direct the President’s 
ultimate position.  Having yielded much of the ground on substance, 
Congress has an opportunity for a second bite at the apple, and may 
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influence the policy directions of the presidency simply by manipulating its 
internal workings.   
A recent example illustrates the point.  In 2017, the newly-elected 
President threatened a trade war with China, Mexico, Canada and other 
longtime allies and competitors around the globe, proposing high tariffs on 
imports of steel, and specific products such as foreign-made vehicles.1  His 
own political party controlled the House and Senate, but there was little 
appetite in Congress for raising tariffs.  So he turned inward, looking to his 
own cabinet to effectuate his plans.  Government lawyers dusted off a 
rarely-used delegation from Congress, Section 232 of the Trade Expansion 
Act of 1962, which permits the President to adjust restrictions on imports 
when the Secretary of Commerce finds that they impose a threat to national 
security.2   
With his statutory authority contingent upon meeting this procedural 
requirement, the President demanded that the Commerce Secretary 
consider the effects on national security of steel and aluminum imports, 
asserting meanwhile, in an expansive interpretation of this statutory 
exception, that the nation’s economic welfare is itself a matter of national 
security.3  The Secretary of Commerce, following the statute’s requirements, 
consulted with the Secretary of Defense, who told him, in a diplomatically-
worded missive, that the adjustments proposed by Commerce were in fact 
unnecessary for national security, and could have negative consequences for 
U.S. relationships with important allies.4  Those steps taken, and despite the 
Defense Secretary’s warning, the President moved ahead on the Commerce 
                                                      
 
1  The President’s 2017 Trade Policy Agenda, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES TRADE 
REPRESENTATIVE (2017), 
https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/files/reports/2017/AnnualReport/Chapter%20I%20-
%20The%20President%27s%20Trade%20Policy%20Agenda.pdf; Peter S. Goodman, Trump’s Trade 
War May Have Already Begun, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 30, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/30/business/economy/trumps-mexico-china-tariff-trade.html; 
Bob Bryan & Elena Holodny, Trump’s Considering a Tariff that Could Put the Economy on a Path to ‘Global 
Recession,’ BUSINESS INSIDER (Jun. 30, 2017, 10:24 AM), https://www.businessinsider.com/trump-
steel-tariff-china-germany-japan-global-recession-2017-6. 
2 19 U.S.C. § 1862(b)-(c) (2018). Prior to the Trump Presidency, Presidential authority to 
impose tariffs had only been exercised a total of five times across the authority’s sixty-three-year 
existence. Cong. Research Serv., RL45249, Section 232 Investigations: Overview and Issues for 
Congress Appendix B (2018). 
3  Presidential Memorandum for the Secretary of Commerce, (Apr. 27, 2017), 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/presidential-memorandum-secretary-commerce/; 
Memorandum on Steel Imports and Threats to National Security, (Apr. 20, 2017) 
https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/DCPD-201700259/pdf/DCPD-201700259.pdf. 
4 Letter from James N. Mattis, Secretary of Defense, to Wilbur L. Ross Jr., Secretary of 
Commerce, (2018) (on file with author), originally found at 
https://www.commerce.gov/sites/commerce.gov/files/department_of_defense_memo_response_t
o_steel_and_aluminum_policy_recommendations.pdf.  
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Secretary’s report, imposing additional tariffs on both steel and aluminum 
imports.5   
Members of the President’s own party in Congress issued unusual 
rebukes of the President’s action, denouncing the measures as a “tax hike 
on American manufacturers, workers and consumers,” 6  and asked the 
President to dial back the global tariffs.7  They did not, however, exercise 
their power to withdraw the President’s authority to adjust imports, an 
authority that Congress itself had given to the President through 
increasingly expansive delegations since the 1930s.8 
Yet congressional reticence to reassert dominance over trade policy is 
not the end of the story.  There is another tool of control that members of 
Congress yet seek to deploy and which, despite increasingly relinquishing 
power to the President, Congress has used several times before in order to 
influence the direction of U.S. trade policy.  And that is to restructure the 
decisionmaking process inside the executive branch in order to preference 
decisionmakers and processes more likely to favor their preferred 
outcomes.   
Indeed, members of Congress have introduced several bills seeking to 
do just that.  In 2018 and 2019, several bipartisan groups of lawmakers 
introduced bills in both the House and Senate to retract from the Secretary 
of Commerce the power to invoke a national security justification for 
raising tariffs on foreign imports.9  The bills would grant that power instead 
to the Secretary of Defense—the very cabinet secretary who had, the bill 
proponents surely noticed, criticized the Commerce Secretary’s proposed 
indiscriminate tariffs.10 Such micro-management over the executive branch 
decisionmaker is not an untested tool for Congress.  In fact, the bills would 
                                                      
 
5 Section 232 Investigations: Overview and Issues for Congress, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, 
(November 21, 2018), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R45249.pdf.  The President also negotiated 
exceptions on a country-by-country basis.  Id. 
6 Chairman Orrin Hatch, Statement on Steel, Aluminum Tariffs (March 8, 2018) (available at: 
https://www.finance.senate.gov/chairmans-news/hatch-statement-on-steel-aluminum-tariffs). 
7 Vicki Needham, Ways and Means Sets Hearing on Trump’s Tariffs, THE HILL (Apr. 5, 2018, 5:17 
PM), https://thehill.com/policy/finance/381875-ways-and-means-set-hearing-on-trumps-tariffs.  
8 See infra II.C.2 (detailing historical development of the national security justification for 
imposing tariffs). 
9 H.R. 6923, 115th Cong. § 4 (2018); S. 3329, 115th Cong. § 2 (2018); Trade Security Act of 
2019, S. 365, 116th Cong. (2019); Bicameral Congressional Trade Authority Act of 2019, S. 287, 
116th Cong (2019). 
10 See supra note 4.  Former Defense Secretary Mattis resigned between the 2018 and 2019 bill 
proposals, but press releases accompanying the 2019 proposals, such as one stating the purpose was 
to counter “misuse” of the national security justification and “to ensure that the statute is used for 
genuine national security purposes,” suggest that bill proponents view the Defense Department’s 
constraining effect on the use of the national security justification as departmental, rather than 
unique to Mattis.  See Press Release, Portman, Jones, Ernst, Alexander, Feinstein, Fischer, Sinema & Young 
Introduce Trade Security Act to Reform National Security Tariff Process (Feb. 6, 2019), 
https://www.portman.senate.gov/newsroom/press-releases/portman-jones-ernst-alexander-
feinstein-fischer-sinema-young-introduce 
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make the Office of the Defense Secretary at least the sixth distinct 
congressionally-designated executive branch office to wield that authority 
since Congress began delegating away its power over the nation’s trade 
policy.11   
Why might members of Congress who want to challenge the 
President’s trade policies deploy an indirect tool of micro-management over 
the executive branch’s decisionmaking process, rather than simply direct 
the policy themselves through substantive legislation?  And could such an 
indirect tool have any real effect?   
In fact, indirect tools such as the choice of executive branch 
decisionmaker or the restructuring of internal decisionmaking processes can 
entirely redirect the President’s policy outcomes, and members of Congress 
often have reason to prefer these mechanisms to more direct legislation.  
Thus, while Congress may defer or even delegate to the President on 
matters of substantive foreign policy—and while members of Congress 
may not rest assured that the President will implement their will even when 
they do mandate substance—Congress may nevertheless shape the nation’s 
foreign policy through what I term “congressional administration.”12   
Congressional administration, as I define it here, is the management and 
manipulation of internal executive branch decisionmaking processes for the 
purpose of advancing a substantive agenda.  Congress has an array of 
measures that it may deploy to influence the nation’s foreign policy, short 
of mandating the substance itself.  These “process controls” include 
familiar tools such as agency design and procedural requirements, but they 
also include the designation and reassignment of decisionmaker within the 
executive branch.  Each of these may be deployed for different purposes, 
with different effects and risks, and each has significant effects on the 
ultimate policy direction the United States takes. 
This Article sits at the intersection of two broad bodies of literature, 
one on congressional-executive turf wars over foreign affairs and national 
security, and one on agency design and political control over the 
                                                      
 
11 See generally Edward E. Groves, A Brief History of the 1988 National Security Amendments, 20 LAW 
& POL’Y INT’L BUS. 589 (1989). The executive agents who have been tasked with fulfilling the 
requirements of Section 232 include: Director of Defense Mobilization (1955), Director of the 
Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization (1958), Director of the Office of Emergency Planning 
(1962), Director of the Office of Emergency Preparedness (1968), Secretary of the Treasury (1974), 
and Secretary of Commerce (1979). 
12 I use this term as a congressional corollary to then-Professor Elena Kagan’s “presidential 
administration,” which she identified as presidential control of the bureaucracy as a means to 
advance “the President's own policy and political agenda,” particularly in the face of political 
obstacles to doing so through other means.  Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. 
REV. 2245 (2011).  Jack Beermann uses this term directly, to describe Congress’s ongoing 
involvement in the “day-to-day administration of the law.”  See Jack Beermann, Congressional 
Administration, 43 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 61 (2006).  
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bureaucracy.  Scholars have long debated the proper constitutional 
allocation of power between the President and Congress over the direction 
of the nation’s foreign policy.  As a practical matter, however, the 
conventional wisdom holds that “the President (almost) always wins in 
foreign affairs.” 13   The reasons for presidential primacy are legion: 
institutional competence; asymmetrical expertise and information; more 
costs than benefits to Congress in engaging.  Moreover, many argue that 
even when Congress does engage directly and substantively on a matter, the 
President often manages to assert authority to act, either by interpreting his 
statutory authorities broadly, 14  or by establishing his constitutional 
prerogative to act unilaterally,15 or even by skirting the legal constraints 
altogether.16   
But the fact that the President usually “wins” vis-à-vis Congress does 
not mean that the position the President ultimately chooses to take is 
preordained.  Nor does it mean that the policy the President ultimately 
adopts at the end of a long winding process is the one he would have 
chosen if all of the options were simply laid out before him at the outset.  
In fact, presidential primacy does not even mean that the policy the 
President ultimately adopts has actually received the personal sign-off of the 
President. 
Indeed there is another dynamic beyond that of the President-Congress 
relationship that is essential to understanding foreign policy positioning and 
is as much of a hotbed for diversity of opinion.  This is the multi-faceted, 
many-headed organism that is the executive branch bureaucracy.  That 
there is a diversity of opinion within the executive branch, especially on 
matters of foreign policy and national security, should be clear these days to 
anyone who picks up a newspaper.17  That the process for decisionmaking 
inside the executive branch influences the resulting policies is perhaps less 
intuitive, particularly to those who envision a unitary executive headed by a 
willful President with his fingers in every pot.  And yet it is so.  
Furthermore, there exist opportunities for influencing these processes, and 
                                                      
 
13 Harold Koh, Why the President (Almost) Always Wins in Foreign Affairs: Lessons of the Iran-Contra 
Affair, 97 YALE L.J. 1255 (1988);See also, Aaron Wildavsky, The Two Presidencies, 4 TRANS-ACTION 7 
(1966). 
14 See Libya and War Powers: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Foreign Rel., 112th Cong. (2011) 
(statement of Hon. Harold Koh, Legal Adviser, U.S. Dept. of State, Washington, D.C.) (available at 
https://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/062811_Transcript_Libya%20and%20War%20Po
wers.pdf).  See also Adrian Vermeule, Our Schmittian Administrative Law, 22 HARV. L. REV. 1095 (2009) 
(arguing that administrative law is sufficiently vague to enable Presidents to act without constraint at 
the invocation of emergency, and that this is inevitable).  
15 See Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076 (2015). 
16 For a bit of all three, see Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Attorney General, to 
Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President (Aug. 1, 2002), (available at: 
https://www.justice.gov/olc/file/886061/download). 
17 Or, if this is anachronistic, then to anyone who is on Twitter. 
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thus the resulting policy, from the outside.  Of specific relevance here, 
Congress has robust means at its disposal to shape these processes and thus 
the resulting decision. 
I have written previously about the multiplicity of decisionmakers, 
processes, overlapping interests, and conflicting proclivities inside the 
executive branch, and the potential for external actors to shape the 
President’s positions by triggering different decisionmaking pathways.18  I 
focused in prior work on the role of litigants, NGOs, and international 
treaty bodies in prompting different processes and the potential for 
achieving different outcomes.19  But members of Congress have far greater 
opportunities than most for triggering and even for restructuring different 
decisionmaking pathways, including for designating their preferred internal 
official as the decider over a given matter. 
While executive branch decisionmaking may at times appear opaque 
from the outside—particularly in the realm of foreign policy and national 
security—savvy government watchers, scholars, and even members of 
Congress can often glean a sense of its inner workings: which matters are 
subject to internal debate, who within the administration may be inclined 
toward particular policies, and where the pressure points lie for 
decisionmaking.20  Actors inclined to lean into these pressure points may 
therefore find they can influence policy outcomes simply by exerting 
influence on the shape of executive branch decisionmaking.   
Members of Congress have especially potent tools for shaping the 
process of decisionmaking, through legislation directly creating procedural 
requirements or designating decisionmakers, as well as through “soft” 
mechanisms such as requests for testimony from particular executive 
branch officials,21 all of which can shape and shift presidential priorities, 
force to a head executive branch decisions, exacerbate internal tensions, or 
place a thumb on the scale in favor of a particular set of actors engaged in 
intra-executive branch conflict.  Through the use of these process controls, 
Congress can and does shape the process of executive branch 
decisionmaking and influence policy without necessarily mandating a 
particular substantive outcome. 
                                                      
 
18 Rebecca Ingber, Interpretation Catalysts and Executive Branch Legal Decisionmaking, 38 YALE J. 
INT’L L. 1531 (2017). 
19 Id. 
20 In fact, members of Congress often have significant ties to the executive branch both 
through their own personal relationship to members of the political class within the administration, 
and through staffers’ often deep connections to agencies, through prior positions, former colleagues, 
and the fact that they are repeat players on specific issues.  See, e.g., Ashley Deeks, Statutory 
International Law, 57 Va. J. Int’l L. 263, 296-297 (2018). 
21  See JOSH CHAFETZ, CONGRESS’S CONSTITUTION: LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY AND THE 
SEPARATION OF POWERS (2017) (arguing that Congress has many tools both “hard” like 
appropriations and “soft” like speech, which it underutilizes). 
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This Article proceeds as follows: Part I first considers scholarly debates 
over the legal and practical allocation of the foreign affairs power, including 
the extent to which Congress is able effectively to constrain the President in 
this sphere.  Acknowledging the practical reality of presidential primacy in 
matters of foreign affairs, it turns to scholarship considering the interaction 
of Congress with the internal workings of the executive branch 
bureaucracy.  This scholarship largely brackets off the fields of foreign 
policy and national security; thus bringing insights from administrative law 
and political science scholarship on political control of the bureaucracy to 
bear on debates about the allocation of foreign policy power is one 
contribution of this Article. 
Part II introduces and classifies what I term “process controls,” the 
mechanisms that Congress may deploy to influence the executive branch 
decisionmaking process, and through it, the shape of foreign policy.  Two 
types of measures that I include within the term process controls—agency 
design and the imposition of administrative procedures—have been the 
subject of significant scholarship in both administrative law and political 
science.22  I therefore consider these each in turn here in order to examine 
their relevance and influence on questions of foreign policy and national 
security, which are generally excluded from scholarship over agency design 
and administrative procedure.   
I devote the majority of this Part, and of the Article, to identifying and 
analyzing a specific type of process control that has not been the focus of 
scholarship: the designation of executive branch decisionmaker.  Among 
the controls I discuss in this Article, Congress wields significant, targeted 
control over decisionmaking inside the executive branch simply through its 
choice of intra-executive decider. This is not a one-off decision; Congress 
may—and does—reassign the decisionmaker as new events arise or policy 
preferences shift.  Members of Congress thus may seek to shift a delegation 
of authority horizontally, from one executive branch official or office to 
another who may espouse policy preferences more in sync with their own.  
Or they may allocate power vertically, such as upward toward a high-level 
official, if they are looking to increase political accountability for a decision, 
or downward to professionals and technocrats, when seeking to buffer an 
issue from partisan politics.  Or they may try to diffuse power, perhaps as a 
means of constraining government action, for example by requiring 
consultation among or even certification by several different officials.   
Part III considers the implications of Congress turning to process 
controls to shape foreign policy.  It considers when and why Congress 
might turn to process controls over more direct efforts to mandate 
substance, and which particular process controls are likely to be effective at 
                                                      
 
22 See infra Part I. 
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implementing particular purposes. This Part also probes the unique 
constitutional questions raised by congressional administration of foreign 
policy, as well as the risks at stake—risks to good government and to 
accountability for decisionmaking.   
In considering the influence of internal decisionmakers and processes 
on executive branch policy, and Congress’s ability to influence its direction 
through these processes, this Article also adds texture to debates about a 
“unitary executive” model of executive branch decisionmaking.  I discuss 
the implications of process controls for formal doctrine and the potential 
for judicial review in Part III.  But the influence of process controls on 
policy I discuss in this paper more broadly provides a functional critique of 
unitary executive theory.  Wherever the line ultimately falls on the formal 
powers of the President over those within the executive branch, the 
multiplicity of decisionmakers and processes will always provide practical 
opportunities for influencing and even manipulating executive branch 
policies, from within the executive branch and without. 
Congress has ceded significant ground to the President on matters of 
foreign policy and national security, and continues to do so, often 
abdicating its responsibility to craft policy or to provide substantive, 
rigorous oversight.  Moreover, Congress has at times lost ground to the 
President even when it has attempted to assert its prerogative.23  But this 
Article nevertheless challenges views of the presidency as completely 
untethered to law or to congressional constraint.  Congress may be overly 
timid in this space, and it may at times be ineffective, but it can and does 
exercise its power to shape foreign policy short of mandating substance, 
and it could deploy these process controls even more instrumentally to 
impel decisionmaking in its preferred direction. 
I. FOREIGN AFFAIRS POWER AND BUREAUCRATIC CONTROLS 
This Article sits at the intersection of two broad bodies of literature, 
one on congressional-executive power struggles over foreign affairs and 
national security, and one on agency design and political control over the 
bureaucracy.  
A. Congressional-Executive Allocations of Foreign Affairs Power 
It has long been conventional wisdom that the President exercises 
significantly more control over foreign affairs than does Congress.  As a 
matter of constitutional authority, scholars continue to debate the proper 
                                                      
 
23 See Zivotofsky, 135 S. Ct. 2076. 
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allocation of foreign affairs power between the President and Congress.24  
And yet as a practical matter, the question quite rarely comes to a head.25  
This is not for lack of possible flashpoints, but rather because Congress 
rarely deploys all the power it clearly holds, let alone tries to push the 
envelope.  In fact, Congress has a wide range of methods at its disposal for 
exercising direct authority over foreign affairs well within its explicitly 
allocated authority—from committee oversight to appropriations to 
declarations of war.26  Yet members of Congress have often been reticent to 
use this power, for reasons both practical and political, and Congress’s 
formal authority generally well exceeds its functional willingness to deploy 
it.  To the extent that longstanding practice affects the balance of powers 
among the branches, this acquiescence by Congress in the executive’s 
stranglehold on foreign affairs may even result in a formal shift in power 
over time to the executive.27  
The reasons for congressional reticence to get involved in foreign 
policy are overdetermined.28  Some are based in rational justifications like 
institutional competence and good government.  Much of the foreign 
affairs and national security expertise is now housed in the executive 
branch, and thus some level of deference to their more granular knowledge 
may be justified.29  Exponential increases in complexity and classification 
lead to significant information asymmetries between the branches.30  And to 
the extent it is advantageous that the state speak with “one voice” on the 
international plane, the President is the likeliest option for holding that 
mantle.31  Some reasons are practical: collective action takes time, and the 
                                                      
 
24 Compare Saikrishna B. Prakash & Michael D. Ramsey, The Executive Power over Foreign Affairs, 
111 YALE L.J. (2001), with Julian Mortenson, Article II Vests Executive Power, Not the Royal Prerogative, 
COLUM. L. REV. (manuscript at 119) (Forthcoming, 2019) (on file with author). 
25 A recent notable exception is the case of Zivotofsky v. Kerry, in which the State Department 
refused to implement a statutory requirement that passports for individuals born in Jerusalem list the 
place of birth as “Israel.”  The Supreme Court heard the case and held that the statutory requirement 
impermissibly infringed on the President’s plenary power over recognition of foreign governments. 
See Zivotofsky, 135 S. Ct. 2076.  
26 See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art I, § 8. 
27 See, e.g., Curtis Bradley & Trevor Morrison, Historical Gloss and the Separation of Powers, 126 
HARV. L. REV. 411 (2012).  
28 See, e.g., Wildavsky, supra note 13 (arguing that, among other reasons, foreign policy engages 
fewer clear partisan preferences than domestic matters, requires expertise the public does not tend to 
have, and thus Congress tends to cede to the President a freer hand on such matters). 
29 Terry Moe & William Howell, Unilateral Action and Presidential Power: A Theory, 29 Pres. Stud. 
Quart., at 855-56 (1999). 
30 Patricia M. Wald & Jonathan R. Siegel, The D.C. Circuit and the Struggle for Control of Presidential 
Information, 90 GEO. L.J. 737, 737 (2002). 
31 See, e.g., LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 42 (1996) (“That the 
President is the sole organ of official communication by and to the United States has not been 
questioned and has not been a source of significant controversy.”); Curtis A. Bradley and Jack L. 
Goldsmith, Presidential Control over International Law, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1201, 1258 (2018).  But see 
Kristen Eichensehr, Courts, Congress, and the Conduct of Foreign Relations, 85 CHI. L. REV. 609 (discussing 
the under-theorized reality of congressional communication with foreign nations). 
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President is considered to be at least relatively “unitary” and thus can act 
with dispatch that the other branches do not enjoy.32  Moreover, while 
members of Congress have many tools at their disposal, including the 
power of the purse, they do not themselves command militaries.33  But, 
Congress being Congress, the most significant reason for congressional 
listlessness in foreign affairs is likely the political one.  Most members of 
Congress have likely determined that the political costs to engaging in 
foreign policy are not worth the political benefits, and tend to engage in this 
arena only when they are.34 
All of this is, of course, a matter of intense scholarly discussion and 
disagreement.  In addition to disagreement over whether Congress has 
abdicated its authority over foreign affairs, and whether the President has 
wrongfully aggrandized his power, scholars have also questioned the extent 
to which Congress even can rein in the President when it tries to.35  Many 
scholars have rightly noted the difficulties Congress faces in changing the 
President’s course of action in the foreign affairs and national security space 
even when it chooses to legislate constraints. 36   These concerns are 
compounded by other public law scholarship questioning the extent to 
which the President is bound by law generally.37 
Debates over the foreign affairs power focus primarily on questions of 
authority over substance: which body is charged with making major policy 
decisions about a given question of foreign relations or national security?  
On that metric, the President does “win” most (even almost all) of the 
time, at least as a functional matter, even when the Constitution explicitly 
grants Congress the authority in question.38  This is so for many reasons—
among them information asymmetries; the ability to act with dispatch; the 
ability to act at all; Congress’s cost-benefit analysis about the political value 
of intervening in foreign affairs.39 
                                                      
 
32  See Bradley & Morrison, supra note 27, at 438-44 (discussing structural and political 
impediments to congressional action). 
33 See Martin S. Flaherty, The Most Dangerous Branch, 105 Yale L.J. 1725, 1818 (1996) (discussing 
the President’s longstanding unilateralism in entering war as one reason for presidential dominance) 
34 For an account of when Congress is more likely to engage, specifically on war powers, see 
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(2006); Koh, supra note 13. 
37 See, e.g., ERIC A. POSNER & ADRIAN VERMEULE, THE EXECUTIVE UNBOUND: AFTER THE 
MADISONIAN REPUBLIC (2011).   
38 See Koh, supra note 13. Authorities the Constitution delegates directly to Congress, which 
Congress has then either handed over to the President or largely acquiesced in his encroachment, 
include the power to declare war and the power to regulate international commerce. 
39 See, e.g, id.; Wildavsky, supra note 13. 
Congressional Administration of Foreign Affairs 
Draft September 18, 2019 11 
Yet presidential primacy is not the end of the story.  That the President 
can ultimately act does not tell us what the President’s course of action will 
be.  Particularly in the foreign affairs realm where novel questions often 
arise and policy preferences do not necessarily divide neatly along partisan 
lines,40 there is often significant room for disagreement even inside the 
executive branch over what action or policy the President should adopt.  
And to bring this full circle, Congress has means at its disposal to pressure 
and shape the nature of those internal debates and decisionmaking 
processes.  
This is where the foreign affairs debate could benefit from the literature 
on congressional control over the bureaucracy, which I explore in the 
section that follows.  Both together inform deeper consideration of the 
multiplicity of ways actors outside the executive branch, including 
Congress, shape Presidents’ actions and policies, as I explore in this Article. 
B. Congressional Control of the Bureaucracy 
There are extensive literatures in both political science and public law 
scholarship on Congress’s interest and efficacy in reining in and otherwise 
controlling the federal bureaucracy.  Much of this literature focuses on 
domestic matters and often even explicitly brackets off the foreign affairs 
or national security bureaucracy.41  Yet despite the possibly exceptionalist 
nature of foreign affairs and national security, many of the dynamics that 
scholarship on bureaucracy considers have relevance for these fields as well. 
As I explain below, these literatures provide an important jumping off point 
for considering Congress’s role in influencing executive branch foreign 
affairs process and policy. 
As in the foreign policy space, scholars of congressional-executive 
relations generally have long reckoned with, bemoaned, or defended what 
has appeared to be congressional abdication to the President of greater and 
greater power.  With the rise of the administrative state and the 
concomitant complexity of modern governance, Congress has increasingly 
moved from narrow delegations of power to the President to broad 
delegations that created a significant sphere of discretion within which 
bureaucrats could act.42  One debate in modern scholarship considers the 
extent to which the result of these broad delegations is an entirely 
unconstrained, all-powerful President; among those who push this 
                                                      
 
40 Wildavsky, supra note 13. 
41 Some notable exceptions to this gap include: AMY ZEGART, FLAWED BY DESIGN: THE 
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Intelligence: Structuring and Overseeing Agencies in the Post-9/11 World, 94 California Law Review 1655 
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42 Kagan, supra note 12, at 2253-54. 
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“executive unbound” version of the presidency, there are many who warn 
of its dangers, and others who view it as essentially a good state of affairs.43 
Others argue that the presidency is not, as an empirical matter, entirely 
unconstrained.  Scholars have pointed to legislative attempts to rein in the 
President with substantive law, and the effectiveness of those efforts, even 
in areas like national security and war where the conventional wisdom says 
the President has enormous leeway.44  They have noted that even when 
Congress fails to legislate, there are a number of other tools it has at its 
disposal for making its interests known and influential.45  And there is a 
significant body of scholarship examining the extent to which Congress 
influences bureaucratic choices through its control over the design of 
agencies structure of decisionmaking, rather than through substantive 
legislation.46 
Scholars have considered the extent to which Congress engages in “ex 
ante” controls, like agency design, and “ongoing” controls, like oversight, as 
a means of managing the bureaucracy, though they debate the purpose of 
these controls.47  Some propose that Congress chooses agency design to 
ensure that agencies hue to their statutory mandate, to, in effect, “hardwire” 
them in order reduce “bureaucratic drift.” 48   Others maintain that 
politicians design agencies primarily with policy preferences and political 
purposes in mind, which may connect indirectly to efficiency and good 
governance to the extent voters are informed on these matters.49  This 
literature intersects with debates on the extent to which congressional 
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power.”). 
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attempts at control have any real effect on bureaucratic outcomes, whatever 
their purpose.50 
Even scholars who do not necessarily see Congress as providing 
significant constraints on the executive have pointed to other constraints 
that rein in Presidential prerogative.  A burgeoning literature has developed 
exploring the role of bureaucratic, or administrative, constraints, reining in 
the President from inside the executive branch.51  But there is work yet to 
be done in considering the extent to which congressional process controls 
on agency structure and design interact with these constraints on the 
President from inside the executive branch.52 
As I have explored in prior work, bureaucratic constraints on the 
President can play a significant role in shaping the process and outcome of 
executive branch decisionmaking,53 but they are created, bolstered—and 
can ultimately be undermined by—political sources like Congress and the 
President himself.  Beyond agency design, Congress has numerous “hard” 
and “soft” tools at its disposal for structuring and restructuring the process 
of decisionmaking inside the executive.54  And it deploys these tools for 
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and Randall B. Ripley, How Congress Influences Foreign and Defense Policy, in JAMES M. LINDSAY AND 
RANDALL B. RIPLEY, CONGRESS RESURGENT: FOREIGN AND DEFENSE POLICY ON CAPITOL HILL 
(1993).  Lindsay and Ripley catalog five different types of what they call “procedural legislation,” 
including variations of agency design, reporting and certification requirements, and “enfranchis[ing] 
new groups in the decision-making process.”  Id. at 28-30.  Lindsay and Ripley do not examine the 
designation of or shift in executive branch decisionmaker as a targeted tool of congressional control, 
but each of these statutory mechanisms they discuss might be deployed as a means of designating or 
changing the decider over a particular policy matter, as I explore in Part II. 
53 Rebecca Ingber, The Obama War Powers Legacy and the Internal Forces that Entrench Executive Power, 
110 AM. J. INT’L L. 680 (2016); Ingber, Interpretation Catalysts, supra note 18; Ingber, Bureaucratic 
Resistance, supra note 51. 
54 I borrow here the terms “hard” and soft” as applied to congressional power from Josh 
Chafetz, who in turn borrowed them from international relations theory.  See CHAFETZ, supra note 45 
(describing two forms of congressional power: hard power to “coerce,” such as the power of the 
purse, and other “soft” tools such as internal rules of discipline and proceedings.) 
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purposes in addition to, and beyond that of, bureaucratic responsiveness to 
political pressure alone, as I explore in this Article.  
The foreign policy and national security spaces provide an especially 
valuable lens for considering this interaction between Congress and 
bureaucratic constraints, as there are numerous conflicting interests inside 
the executive branch foreign policy and national security infrastructure, 
with overlapping jurisdictions, and thus many levers to push and pull to 
influence decisionmaking.  Moreover, novel issues arise or boil over at a 
higher rate than in the purely domestic policy realm, providing new 
“opportunity windows” for Congress and the President to consider matters 
with fresh eyes.55  
Drawing on these literatures, this Article considers a range of 
mechanisms through which Congress shapes executive branch 
decisionmaking and thus the path of U.S. foreign policy.  I focus in 
particular on a set of process controls that are not theorized in scholarship 
on the administrative state—the choice of internal executive branch 
decisionmaker—and consider the purposes, efficacy, and risks of this tool 
of congressional administration over the nation’s foreign policy.  Though 
the focus here is on foreign policy and national security decisionmaking, 
this consideration of process controls has relevance beyond these spheres, 
to still-nascent questions of how Congress interacts with the levers and 
pulleys effectuating decisions inside the executive branch.  
II. PROCESS CONTROLS AS TOOLS OF FOREIGN POLICY 
As I describe in Part I, Congress has, for a range of reasons, fallen short 
in the foreign affairs arena.  Whether it holds a significant body of formal 
power that it refuses to use, or is in fact formally impotent in this sphere, 
there is general agreement on this: Congress does not aggressively legislate a 
substantive foreign policy agenda, and it certainly does not do so at the 
expense of its domestic interests.  This Part demonstrates, however, that 
even as Congress often declines to pursue a substantive foreign policy 
agenda directly, it can and does pursue an array of “process controls” to 
influence the conduct of foreign affairs short of directing which positions 
the President should adopt. 
I use the term “process controls” here to encompass a range of 
mechanisms Congress might deploy to manage executive branch 
decisionmaking.  These include agency design and administrative procedure 
requirements, as well as less familiar mechanisms like switching the 
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decisionmaker inside the executive branch.  Process controls permit 
members of Congress to influence the process and direction of executive 
branch decisionmaking indirectly, often with a light touch, avoiding many 
of the pitfalls and political costs members may fear would arise from more 
direct engagement in foreign policymaking.  Moreover, process controls 
may even at times be more effective than direct substantive legislation; 
while executive branch officials might seek to interpret their way out of 
more substantive legislative constraints in order to protect presidential 
power, process controls commandeer executive branch officials and 
processes themselves to serve as internal constraints on the President.56  
Scholarship on the effects of agency design and administrative 
procedure tends to focus on “political control” over the bureaucracy, a 
term used to refer to the responsiveness and accountability of bureaucratic 
actors to politicians, be they in Congress or the Oval Office.57  Does the 
bureaucracy, in so many words, continue to make decisions that those 
political actors who empowered them would want them to take?  Yet 
process controls can be animated by multiple purposes, beyond policy 
preference.  At times, in fact, the precise purpose for which members of 
Congress may propose or support a particular mechanism is to remove 
decisions from political control, and specifically from the intransigence of 
partisan politics. 
The choice of process control often connects to the reason members of 
Congress may have for choosing this tool over another, more direct form 
of policy engagement. Measures aimed at removing decisions from partisan 
politics, for example, may be deployed if members of Congress believe it is 
important to act on a particular matter, but that political sensitivities stand 
in the way of action unless they give the matter to technocrats.58  Creating 
decisionmaking pathways inside the executive branch allows members to 
shift the political burden off of their shoulders and on to technocrats who 
are free of such constraints.59  At other times, by contrast, members may 
have specific policy preferences, but be reticent to act because of high 
political costs; they may see deploying process controls as a way to 
effectuate or at least approximate their preferences while shifting the cost 
burden.  Even when their goal is a preferred policy objective, members may 
believe they can more effectively implement that policy through the use of 
these measures.  They may even choose these tools over more direct 
substantive legislation mandating a particular policy for reasons of good 
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government, because they actually believe that the executive branch holds 
the upper hand on questions of expertise, or information, or ability, and yet 
nevertheless have views on improving the process to effectuate better 
policies.  And of course, as Congress is itself anything but a monolith, any 
given measure that Congress implements may be driven forward by 
multiple motivations, varying among the members who propose and 
support it.60 
This Part seeks to classify these different process controls according to 
their form and function.  I first address two forms of congressional control 
over the bureaucracy that have been the subject of significant political 
science and administrative law scholarship—agency design and 
administrative procedure requirements—to consider how these measures 
are and can be deployed as tools of foreign policy.  But the focus of this 
Part is the dissection of what I term “designated deciders”: measures that 
shift the decisionmaker horizontally, such as from one agency head to 
another; or vertically, upward toward a cabinet official, or downward 
toward a technocrat; measures that excise responsibility and place it in a 
new body, at a distance removed from existing decisionmakers; and 
measures that diffuse responsibility among several decisionmakers inside 
the executive branch.  I classify these process controls here, and consider 
their purposes, efficacy, and risks in Part III. 
A. Foreign Policy through Institutional Design  
A great deal of political science and administrative law scholarship has 
been devoted to considering agency design as a tool for political control of 
the bureaucracy.61  Much of this literature is devoted to specific ex ante 
creation decisions, such as agency independence from the President as 
measured by a single vector, control over appointment and removal of the 
agency’s leadership.62  This focus has less salience in the foreign policy and 
national security arenas, where presidential power over the bureaucracy is 
arguably at its peak. Informal norms of independence for some specific areas 
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such as intelligence and law enforcement do exist, as well as occasional, 
narrowly-tailored attempts at congressionally-mandated independence in 
this sphere, though the constitutionality of removing these powers from 
presidential control remains a matter of hot debate. 63   But agency 
independence is not the primary vector along which Congress exerts 
influence in the foreign policy and national security arena.  It is thus worth 
considering the foreign policy implications of other aspects of agency 
design. 
Congress is involved in the institutional design of the foreign policy and 
national security infrastructure from top to bottom. Most of the agencies 
and offices are, of course, created by legislation,64 and Congress has thus 
been the critical player in creating most of the structures that engage our 
foreign policy since the founding.65  That Congress chose to lodge so much 
power in the Presidency through the establishment of, for example, a 
Secretary of State and executive agency engaged in foreign affairs—the 
Department of State—wholly subordinate to the President right from the 
beginning might suggest congressional acquiescence in the executive’s 
foreign affairs predominance.66  But Congress’s role in the institutional 
design of foreign policy does not begin and end with that initial creation of 
a federal agency.  Rather, Congress continues to remain involved through 
both the regular creation—or termination—of offices within these 
agencies, through the designation of personnel, including their employment 
status and relationship to the President, and through the earmarking of 
appropriations to agencies and offices.67   
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President, “Congress had cut itself out of the picture.”). 
67 See, e.g., 22 U.S.C. § 2651a(f) (2018) (requiring the establishment of “a Coordinator of United 
States Government Activities to Combat HIV/AIDS Globally … to operate internationally to carry 
out prevention, care, treatment, support, capacity development, and other activities for combatting 
HIV/AIDS”). 
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At times of great upheaval or controversy, Congress has engaged this 
particular tool aggressively to restructure the foreign policy or national 
security institutions of the U.S. government.  After World War II, Congress 
reorganized the bureaucracy of warfighting and intelligence through the 
National Security Act of 1947 and subsequent statutes, creating the 
National Security Council (NSC), the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 
and other offices responsible for intelligence sprinkled throughout the 
executive branch national security establishment, as well as consolidating 
the armed services and civilian components of war under one department, 
the Department of Defense (DOD).68  And Congress has re-engaged in 
ways both small and big, including in response to the Church and Pike 
Committees, and again after 9/11, to restructure the intelligence 
community to rein in perceived excesses or resolve perceived deficiencies.69 
Often, Congress acts in conjunction with the President to engage in 
shared foreign policy goals.  Even within that context, negotiations over 
precisely how to structure an agency or which programs to fund provide 
members of Congress—and especially members of the relevant 
committees—with a means to influence executive policy-making, including 
by narrowing executive requests even while agreeing to delegate power.70 
But at times, Congress engages its design tools in ways that directly 
oppose the sitting President’s prerogatives, sometimes favoring specific 
bureaucrats within the rest of the executive branch.  This takes many forms, 
including refusals to fund a Presidential priority, which would have a direct 
effect on the President’s policy-making by entirely or partially impeding it.  
It also includes the opposite: refusals to cut funding to agencies or offices 
that Congress deems important, thus privileging the bureaucrats within 
those agencies in disregard of the President’s preferred approach.  One 
prominent recent example from the past few years has been Congress’s 
repeated pushback against the Trump administration’s aggressive proposal 
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to cut the State Department budget, initially by 28%.71  During budget 
hearings in front of the House and Senate Committees in 2017, members 
of Congress excoriated then-Secretary Rex Tillerson’s proposed cuts as 
exhibiting poor foreign policy judgment and potentially endangering 
national security.72  More important than the rhetoric, Congress ultimately 
passed a spending bill that refused the proposed budget cuts, instead 
making only modest cuts from 2017 levels.73 
General appropriations and the creation of executive offices can be 
both blunt and sharp instruments.  In the broadest sense, Congress is 
creating the fora in which foreign policy decisionmaking occurs, and by 
insisting on funding the State Department, for example, at levels similar to 
recent history, Congress makes clear that it intends the executive branch to 
continue to use the “soft” power of diplomacy alongside the “hard” power 
of military force.  But such appropriations themselves can also include 
more directed tools—for example, the 2018 fiscal bill included foreign 
assistance for HIV programs that the Trump administration had wanted to 
cut, specifically ensuring the continuation of an office devoted to policy 
objectives contrary to the President’s.74 
The existence of a building and offices with funding alone does not 
direct policy outcomes, of course; but members of Congress are well aware 
that individual agencies have distinct mandates and that personnel tend to 
gravitate toward offices and agencies that match their priorities.  Thus, 
privileging funding for, say, the State Department will prioritize a different 
set of policy goals—specifically diplomacy, soft power, foreign aid—than 
would funding for the Department of Defense.  Creating the fora for 
particular types of decisionmaking and ensuring that they remain populated 
with personnel devoted to a particular mandate creates path dependencies 
and presumptions that favor continuity of particular policy objectives, and 
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state-departments-main-focus-should-be-on-us-security/2017/06/13/0438ebdc-503f-11e7-be25-
3a519335381c_story.html?utm_term=.df96264f3e8c; Press Release, House Foreign Affairs 
Committee, Royce Remarks at Foreign Affairs Budget Hearing for Secretary Tillerson (June 14, 
2017); https://foreignaffairs.house.gov/press-release/royce-remarks-at-foreign-affairs-budget-
hearing-with-secretary-tillerson/. 
73 Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-141 Div. K. 132 Stat. 348, 833-971 
(2018).  Notably, the bill included aid for programs that the Trump Administration had proposed 
severely cutting. Julie Hirschfeld Davis, Spending Plan Passed by Congress is a Rebuke to Trump. Here’s 
Why, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 22, 2018) https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/22/us/politics/trump-
government-spending-bill.html.  
74 ONE, RED RIBBON OR WHITE FLAG? THE FUTURE OF THE U.S. GLOBAL AIDS RESPONSE 7-8 
(2017) https://s3.amazonaws.com/one.org/pdfs/ONE_WAD_Report_2017.pdf; Consolidated 
Appropriations Act Div. K, tit. III, 132 Stat. at 844-846. 
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hurdles to significant change.  And at the other extreme, the defunding or 
closure of particular offices can have a significant impact on the executive 
branch’s ability to engage a particular area or policy objective.  When 
Congress allocates funding to or away from particular agencies and offices, 
it privileges certain personnel and certain kinds of decisionmaking over 
others, and that this will shape policy outcomes. 
B. Foreign Policy through Administrative Procedure 
Scholars of administrative law and political science have considered 
Congress’s ability to control the executive branch through the imposition of 
administrative procedures, in particular the Administrative Procedures Act, 
which mandates procedures by which executive branch agencies must make 
decisions.75  The Administrative Procedures Act itself largely exempts from 
its application the executive branch’s foreign policy and national security 
decisionmaking. 76   But Congress imposes a variety of procedural 
requirements outside of the APA on the foreign policy and national security 
decisionmaking of the executive branch—such as requirements that the 
executive branch certify that specific criteria are met before it can act to, 
say, provide aid to a foreign nation;77 or that it making a finding in writing 
before it may take covert action;78 or that the President make regular 
reports on his activities to Congress.79 
Scholars of political science and economics McCubbins, Noll, and 
Weingast suggest that Congress turns to administrative procedures as a 
means of ensuring congressional control over the bureaucracy because of 
the sheer impossibility of controlling every decision that the bureaucracy 
makes. 80  In other words, administrative procedures are a second-best 
alternative for members of Congress who would otherwise seek to control 
the substance of decisionmaking directly.  As I explore in this article, 
however, there are multiple reasons—beyond the sheer scale of decisions 
that must be made—that Congress might turn to process over substance as 
a means of influencing policy, and this may be exacerbated in the foreign 
policy context where Congress is even less inclined to legislate substance 
than it is in the domestic sphere.   
                                                      
 
75 See, e.g., McCubbins, Noll & Weingast, supra note 46. 
76 Administrative Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553(a) (2018) (exempting “military or foreign 
affairs function of the United States”).  And the Supreme Court has held that the President is not 
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Scholars have considered the extent to which specific procedures have a 
real effect on government outcomes.  Many have argued that certification 
requirements, for example, are not effective in constraining presidential 
decisionmaking.81  As I discuss in Part III, however, the efficacy of any 
given process control depends on a variety of factors including context and 
the relevant actors, and must be weighed against the likelihood of the 
alternatives, respectively, inaction or substantive congressional legislation. 
A significant body of work applying principles of administrative law to 
foreign policy and national security focuses not on the efficacy of specific 
administrative procedure requirements, but on the extent to which the 
executive branch should be afforded deference on matters of war and 
national security. 82   A thorough discussion of the role of courts in 
influencing policy through their allocation of power inside the executive 
branch is outside the scope of this article, but it is the subject of a 
forthcoming project.  Suffice it to say here that statutory process 
requirements are interwoven with judicial review—they are a means by 
which Congress can more effectively commandeer the courts to help it 
influence executive branch policymaking, and to do so without necessarily 
seeking direct responsibility over the policy itself. 
C. Foreign Policy through Designated Deciders 
The primary focus of this Part is a third category of process control that 
has received little attention in scholarship: the designation or modification 
of executive branch decisionmaker as a means of influencing policy. 
The choice of decider is a process control connected to, and at times 
deployed through the use of, agency design and administrative procedures.  
It is a highly-tailored tool, and can have a significant, targeted effect on the 
policy positions of the U.S. government.  Members of Congress may seek 
to deploy this measure for multiple purposes: to advance a particular policy 
objective, to depoliticize particular decisions or prioritize expertise, or to 
constrain the President.  They may seek to institutionalize a particular 
decisionmaking process long term, perhaps for purposes of more efficient 
governance,83 or they may seek to advance specific short-terms goals, by for 
example designating a particular decisionmaker inside the executive branch 
who they believe holds views more in line with their policy preferences than 
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1170 (2007); Cass R. Sunstein, Administrative Law Goes to War, 118 HARV,. L. REV. 2663 (2005); 
Deborah N. Pearlstein, After Deference: Formalizing the Judicial Power for Foreign Relations Law, 159 U. PA. 
L. REV. 783 (2011); Ganesh Sitaraman & Ingrid Wuerth, The Normalization of Foreign Relations Law, 128 
HARV. L. REV. 1897 (2015); Harlan Cohen, Formalism and Distrust: Foreign Affairs Law in the Roberts 
Court, 83 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 380 (2015). 
83 See infra Part II.C.1 (discussing the use of process controls as a means of effectuating military 
base closures). 
Congressional Administration of Foreign Affairs 
Draft September 18, 2019 22 
the alternative deciders.84  These purposes may and do overlap; moreover 
different members of Congress may be compelled by different motivations 
in supporting the same control measure. 
The choice of decisionmaker may take different functional forms, each 
of which may be usefully deployed for different specific purposes, and hold 
different advantages and risks—to transparency, accountability, and 
effectiveness in meeting a particular purpose.  Some process controls shift 
decisionmaking authority up, to a high-level official, which may increase 
transparency but may also politicize.  Other process controls shift deciders 
horizontally, which could result in a major policy change if the change 
occurs between decisionmakers who hold opposing views.  And still others 
diffuse decisionmaking among different deciders, or allocate it downward 
to technocrats and career officials.  This Section dissects and classifies this 
form of process control according to function.  I then consider in Part III 
the advantages, efficacy, and risks involved in deploying these different 
forms of process controls. 
1. Vertical Shift in Decider 
One process control that Congress deploys is to shift decisionmaking 
authority up or down the hierarchy within the executive branch.  This 
designation may take the form of a delegation of authority to a particular 
agency head, but other procedural tools—such as a certification 
requirement, waiver authority, or reporting obligation—may each be 
deployed as a means of channeling decision-making authority in a particular 
office, or of shifting decision-making authority further down the chain of 
command.  This category of process control may be deployed for the 
purpose of promoting a particular policy objective by advantaging a favored 
agency or official, of constraining presidential prerogative, or of ensuring 
that a particular agency’s expertise is deployed in a decisionmaking process.  
It could also be motivated by an interest in increasing accountability for a 
particular type of decision.85  Shifting decisionmaking authority up, to, say, 
the head of an agency or even to the President, might be done for the 
purpose of increasing accountability or transparency for a matter, or raising 
the profile of a matter in the public eye.  Shifting authority down, by 
contrast, might be done for the purpose of taking a matter out of the hands 
of the President, and, if shifted to career bureaucrats, of setting a decision 
at a remove from partisan politics, or of ensuring expertise is prioritized in 
the process. 
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Congressional responses to then-President Barack Obama’s pledge to 
shutter the military detention facilities at Guantanamo Bay provide an 
example of both types of vertical shifts—a shift away from Presidential 
control as well as away from anonymous bureaucratic decisionmaking, and 
toward a particular executive branch official, here the Secretary of Defense.   
A brief history is necessary for background:  Obama’s predecessor, 
President George Bush, who first turned to the naval base at Guantanamo 
as a location for military detention facilities in the conflict with al Qaeda, 
himself ultimately asserted a policy of closing the detention facilities.86  
Nevertheless, Obama became inextricably linked with the argument for 
closure, as he made it a campaign pledge while running for President, and 
as one of his very first actions in office issued an Executive Order 
commanding its closure within a year.87  To do so, he established working 
groups that would review the case for detention and recommend 
disposition (transfer, release, continued detention) for each detainee at 
Guantanamo.88 
Opposition to this plan soon grew in Congress, with many members 
calling for the facility to remain open.  Instead of passing a statute 
mandating that the detention facilities remain open, however, Congress 
passed stringent process controls, year after year, which constricted the 
Administration’s efforts to transfer detainees off the base and ultimately 
posed a significant hurdle to closing the facility.  Beginning in 2010, 
members of Congress attached to the defense appropriations bill onerous 
restrictions on the President’s ability to transfer detainees from the facilities 
abroad.89  Rather than simply mandate that Guantanamo remain open, 
either by prohibiting the use of funds to close it (as Congress ultimately 
did 90 ), or by denying funds for transfers full stop (as Congress also 
ultimately did for several countries91), Congress enacted requirements that 
the Secretary of Defense make rigid certifications about the security threat 
                                                      
 
86 See Jack Goldsmith, The Bush Administration Wanted to Close GTMO Because (in Part) of its 
Propaganda Value to Jihadists, LAWFARE (February 5, 2015), https://www.lawfareblog.com/bush-
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of any transfer 30 days before it could occur.92  Among the requirements, 
these provisions mandated that before a detainee could be transferred to a 
foreign country, the Secretary of Defense, with the concurrence of the 
Secretary of State, must certify that the government in question “has agreed 
to take effective steps to ensure that the individual cannot take action to 
threaten the United States, its citizens, or its allies in the future; [and] has 
taken such steps as the Secretary determines are necessary to ensure that the 
individual cannot engage or reengage in any terrorist activity.”93  The result 
of this designation was that Congress took functional decisionmaking 
authority out of the hands of a panel of career executive branch officials 
from national security offices throughout the executive branch, as dictated 
by Executive Order, and funneled it more squarely and transparently into 
the (reluctant) hands of the Secretary of Defense.94 
 There may have been multiple purposes animating Congress’s 
deployment of this process control: certainly some members held strong 
policy preferences in favor of keeping the detention facilities at 
Guantanamo open, and placing constraints on transfers was a means to that 
end.95  These preferences may have been motivated by, or simply coincided 
with, the views of some within the national security bureaucracy inside the 
government, who reportedly opposed closure of the facilities and made 
those views known—including through regular reports on detainee 
recidivism—to members of Congress.96  Other members may have held less 
strongly-formed views on keeping Guantanamo open, and might not have 
supported a substantive bill to that effect, but were either willing to 
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Department of Defense). 
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support—or felt they could not oppose—provisions requiring that the 
Defense Secretary certify transfers out of the prison were not a threat.97  
Whatever the motivations of various members of Congress in 
deploying this process control, it appears to have had a significant effect on 
the substantive policy of Guantanamo closure.  By designating the Secretary 
of Defense as the decider in this context, and not just the decider but the 
public face of the determination, Congress harnessed the reticence of the 
Secretary of Defense to make such certifications, and placed its thumb on 
the scale on the side of those within the Department of Defense and 
elsewhere in the executive branch who were reticent to close the facility in 
internal conflict over Guantanamo transfers. 98   With the certification 
requirements in place, the flow of detainees from Guantanamo slowed to a 
near halt.99   
2. Horizontal Shift in Decider 
Congress may at times seek to shift decisionmaking authority from one 
official inside the administration to another at the same rank, such as from 
one head of an agency to another.  This process control may be motivated 
by a policy agenda, if for example, there is a belief that one individual’s 
policy views may be preferable to another’s.  Or the implementation of 
such a control may simply reflect a view that a particular office is better 
suited for such decisions, or that the public may perceive that to be the 
case. 
An example of a horizontal shift is the changing placement of 
decisionmaking authority over tariffs, and specifically the national security 
justification for imposing tariffs, that I discuss in the introduction.  Section 
232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, as amended, currently authorizes 
the President to impose restrictions on imports if the Commerce Secretary, 
in consultation with the Secretary of Defense, finds them necessary to 
mitigate a threat to national security.100  Recent communications between 
the Commerce and Defense Secretaries in accordance with this legislative 
requirement unearthed concerns by the then-Secretary of Defense James 
Mattis that tariffs proposed by the President and supported by the 
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Commerce Secretary would exacerbate, rather than resolve, national 
security concerns.101  Perhaps hoping to leverage the Pentagon’s reticence in 
this area, several bipartisan groups in Congress have proposed bills that 
would amend Section 232 to place more direct authority squarely in the 
hands of the Defense Secretary to constrain the President from imposing 
tariffs under this provision.102  
Congress does not turn to process controls to influence trade policy 
and constrain the President out of a want of formal authority to direct 
United States trade policy itself.  The Constitution gives to Congress, not 
the President, the power to regulate commerce with foreign nations.103  
That the President today holds significant power to impose tariffs is the 
result of a series of expanding congressional delegations, delegations that 
Congress could, but thus far does not, roll back.104   
And yet, Congress has repeatedly deployed process controls as a means 
of influencing trade policy instead of dialing back delegations of authority, 
even at times deploying these controls alongside expansions of such 
delegations.105  In fact, the horizontal shift contemplated by these recent 
bills is a frequently deployed move for Congress as a means of influencing 
U.S. trade policy.  Congress has already shifted the decisionmaker for this 
particular tariff justification about four times, give or take, since it began 
delegating control over tariffs to the executive branch in the Smoot-Hawley 
Tariff Act of 1930—from a series of offices within the White House, to the 
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Treasury Department, to Commerce, and now it may well move the 
authority again to the Department of Defense.106 
The history of Congress’s horizontal shifts in decisionmaker aligns 
with—and can be partially explained by—an evolution in Congress’s policy 
preferences on trade vis-à-vis the President throughout this period.  
Interestingly, the relative positions of the President and Congress have 
shifted dramatically in the Trump administration from previous political 
contexts when Congress deployed these controls.  At the time of the 
Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 1930, it was Congress looking to restrict 
imports as a means of protecting domestic industry, and the President 
seeking flexibility to reduce tariffs.107  Smoot-Hawley established a series of 
tariffs, and empowered a body called the Tariff Commission, appointed by 
the President with the advice and consent of the Senate,108 to report to the 
President on the need to adjust them, giving the President the authority to 
approve those recommended changes as necessary.109  Subsequent statutes 
expanded the President’s authority to adjust tariffs, and the 1955 Extension 
of Trade Agreement Authority first codified the national security 
justification, requiring the Director of the Office of Defense Mobilization 
(an office within the White House) 110  to investigate national security 
concerns with imports, and report to the President, who was then 
permitted to adjust imports in accordance with the report after the 
President conducted his own independent investigation.111  After additional 
extensions,112 Congress codified the national security exception in the 1962 
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Trade Act, and changed the title of the responsible office to the Director of 
the Office of Emergency Planning to align with the name change within the 
White House.113 
The legislative history provides some context for the decision to deploy 
these controls to place some decisionmaking authority over the national 
security justification in the hands of this White House office.  In particular, 
there was a sense among members of Congress and industry lobbyists that 
obligating this office to issue a report would be more, not less, likely to result 
in a decision to impose tariffs than placing the power with the President 
directly, either because the President might himself be opposed, or because 
taking the explicit authority away from this office would empower other 
stakeholders inside the executive branch—namely the State Department—
who might have reasons, such as diplomatic concerns, to oppose tariffs.114  
In fact, representatives from affected industries hoping to convince the 
President to levy tariffs testified before Congress to this effect, arguing in 
favor of keeping the reporting requirement with the Office of Emergency 
Planning.115  A representative of the textile industries testified that the State 
Department was in fact “resisting a finding by the Office of Civil and 
Defense Mobilization, now called the Office of Emergency Planning, that 
imports of textiles are threatening to impair the national security.”116  Were 
Congress to remove that office from the language of the statute, the 
representative worried, the President might not choose to request their 
advice, out of concern that “a favorable finding in the national security case 
by the Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization … would cause some 
inconvenience so far as diplomatic relations with foreign countries.”117  
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Instead, such a statute “would facilitate the ease with which the State 
Department can subvert and oppose and prevent favorable findings in 
these national security cases.”118  In other words, industry professionals 
believed that despite the Office of Emergency Planning’s placement inside 
the White House, a reporting requirement placed on that office would be 
more likely to compel the President to levy tariffs than were the same 
substantive delegation made to him directly, because he might in that case 
prioritize the views of different actors inside the executive branch, namely 
the State Department.119 
Over subsequent amendments, Congress continued to shift the decider 
over the national security justification, changing the designation first to the 
Secretary of the Treasury,120 when the Office of Emergency Planning was 
abolished, 121  and then to Commerce. 122   At one point, industry 
representatives, particularly the precision ball bearing industry, lobbied 
Congress to shift the authority to the Defense Department, based on 
suggestions that Defense officials would have been more favorable to 
industry interests in promoting tariffs. 123   One member of Congress 
vociferously argued in favor of shifting the authority to DOD, and 
suggested that the Deputy Secretary of Defense and other executive branch 
officials believed shared this belief.124  Ultimately, Congress landed on a 
compromise solution, and amended Section 232 to require that the 
Treasure Secretary, and then the Secretary of Commerce, consult with and 
receive an assessment from the Secretary of Defense.125 
Many of these shifts appear to have been prompted at least in part by 
an interest in meeting the concerns of industry officials who hoped to 
prompt the President to levy, rather than constrain, tariffs on particular 




120 Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, § 127(d), 88 Stat. 1978, 1993-94. 
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125 Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, § 127(d), 88 Stat. 1978, 1993-94. The requirement of 
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industries, in a context where he was deemed unlikely to do so were he 
granted the authority unilaterally.  Today we find the policy preferences 
reversed: the President is inclined to use his delegated authorities to impose 
tariffs, and Congress appears to be seeking ways to constrain him.126  In 
both of these contexts, however, members of Congress have turned to 
process controls rather than changes to substantive delegations of power in 
order to effectuate their preferences. 
3. Excise Decisionmaking Responsibility and Power 
At times Congress may seek to create new entities as a means of placing 
decision-making at a remove from existing options.  Congress’s handling of 
the impasse over military base closures in the late 1980s by creating a new 
commission to make the necessary decisions is a prime example of 
congressional excision of decisionmaking.   
In the wake of the Vietnam war, after the Department of Defense 
under President Kennedy closed over 60 military bases, decisions to close 
military bases became politically fraught.  The Department of Defense was 
determined to cut costs by eliminating “underutilized” bases, and yet 
closing any given military base entailed a sure loss of jobs, raising the 
profile of base closures on the domestic policy agenda for Congress.127  
Congress passed legislation increasingly involving itself in base closure 
decisions, ultimately in 1977 mandating that they approve all large base 
closures.128  Yet voting for base closure was a political hot potato; no 
politician could support closing a military base in his or her own district.129  
As a result, it became nearly impossible for the Department of Defense to 
close military bases, at significant cost.130   
Ultimately, in response in part to changing politics, budgetary concerns, 
and lobbying efforts by the Department of Defense, the concept of closing 
military bases gained support in Congress, at least in theory.131  But the 
question remained how to make that happen considering the domestic 
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political costs.  Delegating the decision directly to DOD did not resolve the 
political question, as the Secretary of Defense was himself a political 
appointee. 132   The solution—proposed by DOD and adopted by 
Congress—was to delegate decisions about base closures to a bipartisan 
commission appointed by the Secretary of Defense, and reporting both to 
him and to Congress.133  The Secretary of Defense and Congress retained a 
veto over the ultimate proposal—each could take action to reject the 
Commission’s list in its entirety—but the process allowed them to shift the 
political costs of choosing a base onto the independent commission, an 
entity less inclined to feel such costs.134 
4. Diffuse Decisionmaking Responsibility and Power 
At other times members of Congress may seek to diffuse 
decisionmaking responsibility and power, rather than channel it to a 
decisionmaking body.  This may be done through a variety of measures, 
including concurrent delegations to multiple agencies, requirements of 
coordination, or mandatory consultation provisions.135  Such requirements 
are fairly common, particularly in the domestic regulatory space, and may 
be motivated by various purposes.  Jody Freeman and Jim Rossi identify 
several different rationales for overlapping control in their article, Agency 
Coordination in Shared Regulatory Space, including: turf wars among members 
of congressional committees; an interest in removing decisionmaking from 
the President; desire to include multiple spheres of expertise in 
decisionmaking; compromise; and accident.136  To this list I would add an 
interest in constraining or slowing down presidential action, which is 
evident in the recent Syria and Republic of Korea bills I discuss in the end 
of this section.137 
Since 2017, Congress has used the National Defense Authorization Act 
to limit the President’s ability to conduct bilateral military operations with 
Russia, through fact-finding conditions placed jointly on the Secretaries of 
Defense and State.  Specifically, the statute conditions funding for such 
bilateral operations on a certification by the Secretary of Defense, in 
coordination with the Secretary of State that “(1) the Russian Federation 
has ceased its occupation of Ukrainian territory and its aggressive activities 
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136 Id. at 1138-43. 
137  Bijal Shah considers and classifies congressional mechanisms to force interagency 
coordination for a range of purposes including constraint of the President in an excellent 
forthcoming article, Congress’s Agency Coordination.  See 103 Minn. L. Rev. (forthcoming). 
Congressional Administration of Foreign Affairs 
Draft September 18, 2019 32 
that threaten the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine and 
members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization; and (2) the Russian 
Federation is abiding by the terms of and taking steps in support of the 
Minsk Protocols regarding a ceasefire in eastern Ukraine.”138  
Similarly, Congress recently added to the defense appropriations act a 
delegation to the United States Cyber Command of the power to undertake 
proportionate defensive cyber operations against Russia, contingent on the 
“the National Command Authority determin[ing] that the Russian 
Federation is conducting an active, systematic, and ongoing campaign of 
attacks against the government or people of the United States in 
cyberspace.”139  The National Command Authority is comprised of the 
President and the Secretary of Defense, and thus a delegation contingent on 
its determination appears to dilute the delegation of power, at least as 
compared to a delegation to the President alone.140  The ostensible purpose 
here is to facilitate the Defense Department’s ability to undertake these 
kinds of defensive cyber operations, and the inclusion of the Secretary of 
Defense as a necessary component of the determination of Russian activity 
would seem designed to assist in that endeavor.  This may well operate to 
facilitate action in practice, depending on the process the Secretary of 
Defense and the President have for making National Command Authority 
decisions.  But as a general matter, a mechanism of joint control such as 
this one likely would be more effective as a means of constraining the 
President—as it positions the Secretary of Defense as a statutory hurdle to 
action. 
Recently, a spate of proposed bills have sought to engage this process 
tool as a means of effectuating a particular policy.  In 2018 and 2019, 
several senators introduced bills to engage several national security agencies 
in the decisionmaking process over new sanctions on Russian over election 
interference.  Senators Marco Rubio and Chris Van Hollen twice proposed 
a bill—titled the DETER Act—that would place the critical trigger over 
foreign state sanctions in the hands of the director of national intelligence 
and other intelligence officials—and quite pointedly not the President.141  
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130 Stat. 2488 (2017) (amended 2018, 2019).  The NDAA 2019 includes a carve-out for “bilateral 
military-to-military dialogue between the United States and the Russian Federation for the purpose 
of reducing the risk of conflict.” Id. at § 1247. 
139 John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act For Fiscal Year 2019, H.R. 5515, 115th 
Cong. § 1623 (2018). 
140 See also Robert Chesney, The Law of Military Cyber Operations and the New NDAA, LAWFARE 
(July 26, 2018, 2:07 P.M.), https://www.lawfareblog.com/law-military-cyber-operations-and-new-
ndaa (taking note of this designation to the “NCA as opposed to just the president” as “[v]ery 
interesting.”). 
141 Defending Elections from Threats by Establishing Redlines Act of 2018, S. 2313, 115th 
Cong. § 201 (2018); Defending Elections from Threats by Establishing Redlines Act of 2019, 116th 
Cong.  (2019) [hereinafter DETER Act]. 
Congressional Administration of Foreign Affairs 
Draft September 18, 2019 33 
The proposed bill would trigger a requirement that the President—through 
the Treasury Secretary—impose sanctions on Russia or any other state 
should the Director of National Intelligence (“in consultation with the 
Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Director of the 
National Security Agency, and the Director of the Central Intelligence 
Agency”) make a finding that the state has interfered in American 
elections.142  Unlike the cyber operations provisions of the NDAA, which 
simply grant authority, conditioned on the finding of the National 
Command Authority, the DETER act would require action, conditioned on 
the Director of National Intelligence’s finding of fact. 
And in January 2019, a bipartisan group in the House introduced two 
bills aimed—in their own descriptions—at preventing the President from 
withdrawing troops from the Republic of Korea and Syria through funding 
limitations.143  Neither bill would require that the President keep troops in 
either Syria or on the Korean Peninsula.144  Instead, each would make 
funding contingent on specific executive branch officials meeting certain 
procedural obligations.  The Syria bill would prohibit the use of funds to 
withdraw troops from Syria unless Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of 
State, and the Director of National Intelligence submit a report to Congress 
answering fifteen (15) onerous questions about the state of affairs in 
Syria.145  The Republic of Korea bill is far more aggressive: it prohibits the 
use of funds to withdraw troops from the Korean peninsula unless the 
Secretary of Defense and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff certify, inter 
alia, that “the Republic of Korea would be fully capable of defending itself 
and deterring a conflict on the Korean Peninsula that would threaten 
United States interests following such a reduction; [and] that North Korea 
has completed verifiable and irreversible nuclear disarmaments.”146  Should 
they pass, these would undoubtedly face some pushback from the President 
as infringing on his commandeer-in-chief authority, which I discuss further 
below.  But historically, Presidents have often chosen to comply with 
procedural requirements despite raising separation-of-powers concerns, and 
despite the clear hurdle they may pose to their policy agenda.147 
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5. Implicit Allocations of Decisionmaking Power 
In addition to direct, targeted designations of specific deciders, 
Congress also allocates decisionmaking authority inside the executive 
branch implicitly, to unnamed administrators whose work product is 
required by the terms of the statute.  When Congress premises a statutory 
delegation of power to the President or head of an agency on the condition 
that certain procedurals be followed, facts found, or reports provided to 
Congress, this necessitates the involvement of certain types of actors within 
the executive branch, namely: “experts,” “professionals,” “technocrats,” 
lawyers.148  The expert class of officials within the executive branch is 
typically made up of non-politically-appointed civil servants, operating 
around the middle tiers of the executive branch bureaucracy.149  Their role 
is essential to adequately carrying out process requirements like fact-finding 
or reporting to Congress.  Thus, even without explicitly naming an office or 
official in its delegation of power, Congress can influence the organization 
of decisionmaking inside the executive branch by legislating process 
requirements. 
Statutory requirements that executive branch officials engage in 
particular processes, or find specific facts, or explain their actions before 
acting fall within the “administrative procedures” category I discuss above.  
But they are also a vehicle through which Congress can designate deciders 
by steering power away from the President and toward lower level officials, 
even while delegating it to, or accepting its use by, the executive branch as a 
whole.   
III. IMPLICATIONS OF CONGRESSIONAL ADMINISTRATION 
Congressional influence on foreign affairs through the administration 
of executive branch decisionmaking has numerous implications—for 
Congress’s ability to influence foreign policy, for transparency and 
accountability of foreign policy decisions, for the extent to which the 
President is in fact bound by law—and it can be judged according to each 
of these criteria  
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When considering these implications and the value of process controls, 
one must weigh them against the actual alternatives, taking into account the 
potential for their realization.  These alternatives include on the one hand 
more direct involvement of Congress, such as through direct substantive 
efforts to legislate policy, or, on the other hand, an even starker abdication 
of influence to the President.  Congressional administration can be weighed 
against those alternatives on two levels: as a descriptive matter (why might 
members of Congress prefer these forms of engagement to the alternatives) 
and as a more normative one (whether these forms are advantageous as a 
matter of policy, and whether they raise different or fewer constitutional 
issues).   
A. Why Deploy Process Controls to Influence Foreign Policy 
There are many reasons members of Congress might turn to process 
controls to influence policy short of mandating its substance.  Targeted 
process controls may permit members of Congress to push past hurdles 
that would otherwise impede action.  They may provide a means of 
resolving conflicts or promoting a policy that could not be addressed or 
passed through substantive legislation.  At times process controls may even 
be more efficacious in influencing policy than would be substantive 
legislation seeking to mandate it directly.  I explore these reasons in further 
detail in this section.   
1. Why do Process Controls Surmount Congressional Reticence? 
There are numerous reasons Congress does not take full advantage of 
its foreign affairs power.  Some may be based in genuine concern about the 
relative institutional competence of Congress in this realm as against the 
executive branch—whether these concerns are based in a belief that the 
United States should speak with one voice, and that voice should be the 
President’s, or out of a sense of deference to the executive branch’s relative 
expertise, access to information, and dispatch.  For reasons of expediency 
and good government, including the interest in presenting a unified United 
States foreign policy to the world, members of Congress might reasonably 
take the view that the President and the executive branch are best placed to 
control foreign policy decisionmaking.   
Of course, history suggests that these concerns are not sufficient to 
compel Congress to sit out entirely.  There have been multiple occasions 
when members of Congress—both through duly-enacted legislation and 
through separate unilateral action—have sought to press their own foreign 
policy objectives.  Moreover, they have done so not only when the 
President has hesitated to act itself, but even in the face of the President’s 
clear, contrary foreign policy goals.  Congress’s attempt to legislate U.S. 
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recognition of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel is one such example.150  For 
a non-legislative attempt to interfere with the President’s foreign policy 
agenda, consider the “open letter to the leaders of the Islamic Republic of 
Iran,” signed by 47 Republican Senators, opposing President Obama’s Iran 
nuclear deal.151 
I see no separation-of-powers rationale for distinguishing between these 
and other foreign policy decisions in which Congress chooses not to 
challenge the President’s agenda.  Rather the distinction is likely to be a 
political one.  In these limited examples, members of Congress found a 
political advantage to a foreign policy showdown with the President, and 
little disadvantage.  More often, however, there are significant political 
reasons that Congress declines to take a strong stand in the foreign policy 
arena.  When one or both houses of Congress are held by the same political 
party as the President, members may find it politically unsavory or 
inopportune to challenge him generally, especially on foreign policy.152  And 
even when opposing parties control both the House or Senate, members 
may find it more politically useful to be able to criticize the President’s 
choices than having to own a particular foreign policy themselves.  They 
may find that their constituents are not as interested in questions of foreign 
policy as in domestic, and therefore there is little to be gained politically by 
engaging directly in this space.153  Congressional abdication on foreign 
policy matters may also have a self-fulfilling, snowballing effect that 
connects back up to institutional reasons for abdication: as members of 
Congress sit out major debates on war and foreign policy, they lose (or fail 
to gain) expertise in these realms.  And as Congress has fallen back on 
foreign policy, the executive branch has been more than willing to fill the 
void. 
Whatever the reason for congressional timidity in the foreign policy 
realm, congressional administration through process controls provides an 
alternate vehicle to facilitate congressional influence in this realm that may 
avoid some of the stumbling blocks that otherwise hold Congress back.   
First, unlike mandating substance directly, shaping foreign policy 
through the use of process controls enables Congress to exploit, rather than 
undermine, the advantages in the foreign policy realm that the executive 
holds over Congress, such as expertise, or access to information.  As with 
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other areas of policymaking, Congress may quite reasonably acknowledge 
that it is not—at least as it has evolved—capable of tackling the enormity 
and complexity of all decisions that the executive branch bureaucracy 
undertakes.154  Process controls thus permit Congress to influence the 
shape of decisions while benefiting from the vastness and complexity of the 
bureaucracy, and with it executive branch expertise, information, 
expediency, and flexibility. 
Second, congressional use of process controls may permit members of 
Congress to influence policy without necessarily damaging the state’s ability 
to speak with “one voice” in foreign affairs.  While that “one voice” may 
presumptively be the President’s, in practice, it has always been the result of 
executive branch deliberation more broadly.  That Congress may influence 
the internal dynamics that result in that position does not necessarily 
undercut the President’s stature abroad as the expected mouthpiece for the 
U.S. government. 
Third, it may be easier for proponents of a measure to obtain votes on 
a bill including a process control than on one compelling a particular 
substantive policy.  Process controls are often attached to broader 
legislation packages on which members are voting, potentially creating an 
opt-out versus an opt-in scenario for choosing whether to support the bill.  
Moreover, process controls may appear more “neutral” than substantive 
legislation.155  Whereas a substantive provision may engender sufficient 
support to compel members to vote against it, a process control will be less 
likely to be a make-or-break component of the bill.156 
Finally, process controls give members of Congress a means of pushing 
back against a President even when it could be politically costly to do so 
more directly.157  Adding process requirements to a statutory grant of 
power, or designating a particularly trusted executive branch official as the 
decisionmaker on a specific grant of authority, is hardly as headline-
grabbing or as conflict-creating as would be openly legislating a policy 
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contrary to the President’s.  Moreover, process controls typically leave the 
politically sensitive decisions in the hands of bureaucrats—whether lower-
level technocrats or high-level heads of agencies, permitting members of 
Congress to avoid or even deny responsibility for the resulting policy 
should it fail or prove unpopular.  Whether the process control delegates to 
technocrats or to the head of an agency, it permits members of Congress to 
shift the political costs of decisionmaking to the executive branch, while 
still retaining some influence over the policy. 
2. Process Controls and Purpose 
Congressional deployment of process controls to influence foreign 
policy may be motivated by diverse purposes.  In fact, any given 
mechanism of control may be driven by multiple, varied motivations 
among the members of Congress who supported it.158  These motivations 
may include mistrust of the President, conflicting views over the preferred 
policy objective, or an interest in avoiding political costs for a necessary 
action. 
Process control measures deployed for the purpose of promoting a 
preferred policy objective may involve a shift of decisionmaker to an 
agency or office likely to press policy objectives in line with those of 
members of Congress, such as the statutory mandate that the Secretary of 
Defense certify the lack of threat for all transfers out of Guantanamo.159  
Similarly, recent interest in transferring to the Secretary of Defense 
authority over the Section 232 national security justification for tariffs 
appears to be motivated by a desire to minimize the use of that 
exception.160 
Measures intended to depoliticize decisionmaking, or to advance 
particular expertise, will typically allocate power downward, toward career 
officials and “technocrats” within the agency, or an appointed bi-partisan 
commission, rather than toward the President or his direct appointees.161  
Congress’s creation of a nonpartisan commission to issue military base 
closure recommendations fulfilled this purpose, by taking the political heat 
off of members of Congress, who found that votes to close military bases 
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highly unpopular among constituents who would be affected by the loss of 
jobs and resources.162 
  And measures to combat a lack of trust of the President—whether 
based on suspicion of corruption or doubts about his judgment in a given 
area—may deploy any of the above, depending on the extent to which 
other actors within the executive branch inspire greater confidence.  The 
DETER Act bill, discussed above, is a prime example; if passed, it would 
make the Director of National Intelligence (not the President) the arbiter of 
whether Russia were interfering in U.S. elections, thus triggering the 
sanctions in the bill.163  This would permit Congress and the country to 
benefit from the expertise and access to information of the executive 
branch intelligence agencies, while simultaneously taking some 
decisionmaking power away from a President whose motivations in this 
realm many have come to suspect.  And it would do so without implicating 
concerns of a so-called “deep state” seeking power at the expense of 
elected leadership, because the policy objective would come from Congress 
itself. 
B. Efficacy of Congressional Administration 
So does congressional administration in fact influence the shape of 
foreign policy decisionmaking, or is Congress just rearranging deck chairs 
on a ship the president will sail in whichever direction he likes?  While 
administrative procedures and agency design are often held out as tools of 
bureaucratic control, clear accounts of the extent to which these controls 
are effective, and at producing what particular purpose, are rare.164  The few 
scholars who have considered the role of specific administrative procedures 
in influencing foreign policy have taken opposing views on their efficacy.165 
This section considers the efficacy of process controls—and specifically 
the choice of decider measures that I discuss in Section II(C)—in light of 
the various purposes for which they might be deployed.  This is not an 
extensive survey of results.  Such a study would be worthwhile though 
complicated; while numerous examples exist in which process controls 
correlate with a result that accords with purposes I describe above, the 
reasons for a particular outcome may be overdetermined.  There is the 
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problem of “observational equivalence” akin to that faced by scholars 
seeking to demonstrate that the President makes decisions constrained by 
law and not policy preferences that happen to accord with law.166 
Furthermore any given process control itself may be motivated by 
multiple purposes.  Nevertheless, it is possible to deduce from 
understandings of the inner working of executive branch bureaucracy how 
the various process controls I describe above may interact with internal 
levers of decisionmaking, and thus the types of influence they are likely to 
exert, and why, if not whether they will in each event result in a change of 
outcome.  I thus examine here the features of congressional administration 
and contextual factors that are relevant to the inquiry. 
1. The state of play inside the executive branch 
The state of agreement or conflict inside the executive branch on a 
particular matter of foreign policy or national security affects the extent to 
which congressional administration can influence executive decisionmaking.  
Foreign policy and national security are fields that engage many different 
agencies and executive branch offices, with overlapping jurisdictions and 
often conflicting mandates and biases. 167   These complexities provide 
opportunities for influencing outcomes by changing decisionmaking 
processes, responsibilities, and authority.  
To the extent key actors on the inside are all on one page, and that page 
is the President’s, there are few pressure points for members of Congress to 
manipulate to do their bidding.  Happily for Congress, such extreme 
agreement among all components of the executive branch is rare. Often on 
matters of foreign policy and national security there exist serious policy 
differences, either between different agencies or personalities—or both—
and the process of decisionmaking inside the executive branch can have a 
considerable effect on the outcome, in large part because that process 
affects the weight afforded particular decisionmakers, and who will be the 
ultimate “decider.”168  In prior work, I have discussed how triggers outside 
of the executive branch can influence that process, the authority of 
particular internal “deciders,” and thus help shape the ultimate outcomes.169  
Congress has more power than most to influence that process, and thus, 
congressional engagement to place a thumb on the scale of one side can 
have a significant effect on the resulting outcome. 
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For example, in the case of the Guantanamo transfer restrictions, 
members of Congress had reason to believe that the Department of 
Defense, and specifically the Secretary of Defense, would be more reluctant 
to approve transfers than, say, the Secretary of State.  The reasons for that 
belief were plentiful: the Defense Secretary was the lone member of the 
opposing party in the President’s national security cabinet; and the 
Department of Defense was understood to harbor a significant amount of 
dissent inside the building (though not universal dissent) regarding the 
President’s plan to shutter the Guantanamo detention facilities.170  Members 
of Congress also hoping to slow Guantanamo closure had their own 
channels to actors within the Defense Department, and thus were surely 
aware of internal executive branch conflict over detention questions. 
Delegating the requirement to the Secretary of Defense to certify 
transfers privileged the position of the Department of Defense in those 
internal debates with the rest of the executive branch.  And even though 
President Obama signed the Act containing the certification requirements 
with an accompanying signing statement questioning their 
constitutionality, 171  he nevertheless continued to comply—through the 
Secretary of Defense—with the reporting and certification requirements.172  
The result of the certification requirement was that transfers out of 
Guantanamo ground almost to a halt in the aftermath of the legislation.173   
There appear to be similar dynamics at play in the context of the 
Section 232 exceptions to tariff rules.  Here, again, the President and some 
members of his cabinet seem inclined toward action—in this case the 
imposition of significant tariffs on foreign imports across the board—and 
the former Defense Secretary, James Mattis, was believed to hold views 
closer to that of many members of Congress, who did not want to see such 
extreme tariffs imposed broadly.174  Members of Congress have had reason 
to believe, in part due to his own memorandum to this effect, that the 
former Secretary of Defense and later after his departure, the Department 
generally, would be less inclined to certify a national security justification 
for imposing tariffs than was the Secretary of Commerce, and thus they 
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have made a number of attempts to move the authority from the latter to 
the former.   
Congressional reliance on internal tensions may take a short or long-
view.  While any given statutory designation is likely to outlast particular 
appointees, who come and go quite regularly, interagency tensions are often 
longstanding and survive administration to administration, and thus specific 
designations may continue to operate as intended beyond the lifespan of a 
particular appointee.175  Nevertheless, priorities and preferences do shift 
over time, agency mandates are reorganized, and offices are brought closer 
to or further from the White House from administration to administration; 
thus, as with the shifting designations over Section 232 justifications for 
tariffs, members of Congress may find it useful to shift agency deciders 
when the current structure no longer comports with their intentions in 
deploying it. 
2. Process Controls: Formal or Functional Barriers? 
A potential challenge to my account of process controls as an effective 
means of constraining or compelling Presidential action is the argument 
that executive branch actors report to the President and must do his 
bidding.  Designating a decider within the executive may create some 
paperwork requirements, but should not—under this view—affect the 
actual policy result, because that is the President’s to decide.  Whether or 
not this reflects the formal breakdown of power within the executive 
branch (and I do not accept that it does, certainly not for all exercises of 
power), it does not describe the functional reality, in which decisionmaking 
power and process have a significant if not always dispositive role in the 
path of policymaking. 
Most of the examples of congressional administration I discuss in this 
paper involve allocations of power to officials over which the President 
exercises direct removal authority.  Scholars differ on the extent to which 
the removal power is a sufficient political control over bureaucratic 
autonomy.  Under Elena Kagan’s view of “Presidential Administration,” 
the President’s authority implicitly extends to directing these officials to 
take a particular action even if it does not accord with their own views.176  
Their delegated authority is, in other words, really the President’s.177  Gary 
Lawson goes several steps further, arguing that the President should have 
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the power to nullify the acts of subordinates.178  Kevin Stack takes an 
opposing view, arguing that the President does not have authority to direct 
subordinates in cases where statutes delegate executive power to them 
specifically.179 
Yet even accepting arguendo the most aggressive view of Presidential 
power over subordinates’ decisions as a matter of formal authority, as a 
functional matter, process and structure shapes decisionmaking and adds 
hurdles, if not barriers, to the President’s ability to effectuate his preferred 
policies.180  Consider one glaring example: the President’s oft-stated desire 
during the first half of the Trump administration to end the Russia 
investigation run first by the FBI under Jim Comey, and then by the Special 
Counsel, Robert Mueller.181  If the investigation were under his direct, 
immediate control, it is probably fair to say there can be no doubt that he 
would have ended or severely compromised it.  But this was not within his 
direct power, because the investigation was designed to be situated several 
steps removed from the President by personnel if not formal authorities.182  
In his efforts to end the investigation, he removed some officials, such as 
FBI director James Comey, and—ultimately (though slowly)—his Attorney 
General Jeff Sessions,183 and failed to remove others, such as the Deputy 
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182 The regulations governing the special counsel do set the investigation at some remove from 
the President, but as they are created by executive order and not statute, the President holds formal 
authority to change them. See 28 C.F.R. § 600.9 (2018). 
183 This entire paragraph will obviously need some reworking in light of recent events, but my 
claim stands. 
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AG, Rod Rosenstein, and Robert Mueller himself.184  Each removal had, or 
was delayed by, political repercussions, despite the fact that each removal 
was within his formal authority to effectuate.185  And yet he was stymied in 
his efforts to end the investigation, not primarily by formal legal 
constraints, though in this case there may also exist some, but by the 
political hurdles of what ending the investigation would entail and 
require—likely firing each official who refused to end the investigation until 
he were to find someone who would.186  Thus some officials left, but 
Rosenstein remained, along with his decisions to commence and to protect 
the inquiry, despite the fact that the President would not have made those 
decisions himself.  Wherever the formal line is drawn with respect to 
presidential control over executive branch personnel, Presidential control 
through appointment and removal is hardly equivalent as a functional 
matter to Presidential control over the decision itself.   
3. Harnessing of accountability mechanisms 
One of the more effective uses of process controls is the placement of 
public responsibility for a decision directly in the hands of a particular 
official, who will thus understand herself to be accountable for whichever 
decision she chooses going forward.  When this mechanism is combined 
with a legal requirement—for example to find facts, or to certify that 
certain factors are met—this accountability feature raises the stakes for the 
designated individual choosing whether or not to comply with the 
substantive legal requirements.   
Moreover, a procedural requirement is often less open to interpretation 
than, say, whether a particular strike qualifies as “war,” and whether the 
President can undertake it without congressional authorization.  Presidents 
tend to avoid actively asserting non-compliance with law, but they may 
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assert an interpretation that some find far-fetched.187  And the extent to 
which a presidential claim is simply a different interpretation or beyond the 
pale can be particularly hard to police in areas where the law is ambiguous, 
fraught, or evolving.  By contrast, a requirement that the Secretary of 
Defense sign a piece of paper with specific language, or produce a report to 
Congress, provides a much simpler metric by which to judge compliance or 
non-compliance with law. 
By engaging with foreign policy through process controls, Congress 
enlists these internal actors themselves in its cause.  It places the onus on 
these individuals to decide for themselves whether to comply with or 
disregard particular statutory obligations, removing their ability to hide 
behind the President or behind collective action in determining whether a 
statutory requirement must be followed, or whether it is a plausible 
justification to dismiss the requirement as an unconstitutional 
encroachment on the President.  And while Presidents may be protected to 
some degree from certain kinds of accountability, such as prosecution while 
in office, lower-level officials have fewer protections.188  Executive branch 
officials may face both hard and soft forms of personal liability for law-
breaking: from criminal prosecution in some cases, to inspector general or 
GAO investigations to congressional requests and even subpoenas to 
testify and explain actions taken, to disbarment or other professional 
censure to public and professional embarrassment.189  As former Defense 
Secretary Leon Panetta dramatically explained his record of not approving a 
single transfer out of Guantanamo under the congressional certification 
requirements, “that provision required that I sign my life away.”190  For 
these reasons and others, executive branch officials who are designated 
deciders may be more inclined than the President or unnamed groups of 
advisers or officials to comply carefully with the letter of statutory 
requirements. 
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C. Risks in Congressional Administration  
Congressional administration does not put to bed all debates about the 
allocation of foreign affairs authority among the branches of the federal 
government.  In fact, precisely because congressional administration may 
facilitate congressional involvement in areas where members might 
otherwise choose to sit out, congressional influence over foreign policy 
through process controls may provide the flashpoint for thorny 
constitutional questions over the line between the President’s and 
Congress’s authorities.  Beyond these constitutional risks, there are 
potential disadvantages to engaging foreign policy through congressional 
administration.  For example, deploying process controls may give 
members of Congress a false sense of action, mollifying concerns about the 
President’s policy direction or judgment and thus keeping Congress from 
engaging in substantive policy debates more directly.  And process controls 
might at times undermine, rather than promote, accountability for 
decisionmaking.   
1. Constitutional Risks in Congressional Administration 
Congressional administration of foreign policy and national security 
raise distinct constitutional issues from the rest of the administrative state, 
depending on the extent to which a given exercise of control approaches 
the debated zone between the President’s delegated statutory authority and 
constitutional Article II power.  While some level of congressional 
involvement in the design and ongoing process of executive branch 
decisionmaking has a long, and executive branch-accepted, pedigree, the 
executive branch has long bristled at, and often pushed back against, any 
congressional engagement that interferes with, let alone “prevents,” a 
“constitutionally assigned function[].”191  While “constitutionally assigned” 
may be too low a bar for precluding congressional involvement, as there are 
areas where the President and Congress hold concurrent power, the extent 
to which the President may trump Congress in this space is a matter of hot 
debate. 192   And congressional attempts to control policy through the 
bureaucracy itself may raise similar constitutional dilemmas to attempts to 
dictate that policy directly.  Thus congressional involvement in the foreign 
affairs and national security realms raises significantly thornier questions 
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than similar engagement with other parts of the administrative state, which 
rely more exclusively on delegated authority.193   
Some examples may help set the lay of the land.  Certainly a 
congressional attempt to constrain the President’s use of his pardon power 
through, say, a requirement that the Attorney General certify that every 
pardoned individual is sufficiently contrite, would be impermissible.194  The 
executive branch will likewise resist process controls that executive branch 
officials perceive to be interfering with the President’s ability to exercise his 
commander-in-chief authority.195  Yet the extent to which that clause gives 
the President plenary constitutional authority over war, concurrent 
authority with Congress, or in fact very little non-delegated authority at all, 
is controversial. 196   While the Constitution makes the President the 
“Commander-in-Chief,” it gives to Congress not only the power to declare 
war but also the power to make rules governing the armed forces.197  A 
recent proposal by Richard Betts and Matthew Waxman to mandate 
certification by specific internal actors, including a legal review by the 
Attorney General, before the President may order the launch of a nuclear 
weapon raises precisely these questions.198  So too it is far from clear 
whether the congressional requirements that the Secretary of Defense 
certify Guantanamo transfers, for example, present a constitutional conflict.  
President Obama suggested as much in signing statements, and even at one 
point violated the statutory prohibition, but otherwise complied.199  Neither 
matter would likely come before the courts, and because of the executive 
branch’s general track record of compliance with such requirements, both 
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are examples of areas where Congress might effectively rein in the 
President even without necessarily running to ground the scope of their 
authority to do so. 
Outside of the commander-in-chief clause and the authority to appoint 
and receive ambassadors, the President’s foreign policy dominance has less 
clear sourcing, but the executive branch has long sought to claim and 
protect it,200 often, though not always, successfully.201  Yet some areas—
such as international commerce—quite clearly lie within congressional 
control, and have been ceded to the executive only through progressive 
statutory delegations.202  Congress could dial back the President’s authority 
in these areas entirely, and thus the fact that it intervenes through process 
controls rather than through substance should not create any greater 
constitutional problems than engagement with other areas of the 
administrative state. 
It is also worth at least briefly noting here ongoing debates in 
scholarship over the extent to which Congress may direct how the 
executive branch executes the law, in particular debates over the concept of 
a “unitary executive.”  In broad brushstrokes, unitary executive theory 
holds that the President must wield all power vested in the executive 
branch.203  What that means in practice, however, varies across different 
versions of the theory.204   Congressional administration of the President’s 
decisionmaking processes, and in particular the use of process controls to 
designate and change deciders inside the executive, is in tension with more 
aggressive variants.  Thus far, the courts have broadly accepted 
congressional structuring of the executive branch, but I discuss these 
debates here to explain how they would engage with congressional 
administration of foreign policy.205   
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In its most aggressive form, a unitary executive theory might hold that 
any constraints on a President’s ability to exercise executive power—
including through delegating that power to an official other than the 
President—would pose an unconstitutional constraint.206  Of course, that 
would mean the dismantling of most delegations of power to the agencies 
making up the administrative state.  The more widely held view of the 
unitary executive, however, accepts the general structure of administrative 
delegations to agency officials rather than to the President. 207   Most 
adherents of unitary executive theory accept such delegations because they 
hold the view that the way Presidential control of executive power is 
effectuated is through the vesting of final decisionmaking authority in the 
President or officials under his or her control by way of removal.  In effect, the 
argument goes, the President must hold unfettered discretion to appoint 
and remove officials who wield executive power.  Yet the Courts have to 
date upheld Congress’s power to insulate certain agencies and officials from 
presidential control.  In any event, Congress has virtually never sought to 
insulate the foreign policy or national security administration through such 
restrictions on appointment or removal power.208 
Here is where unitary executive theory could intersect with debates 
about the proper allocation of foreign affairs and national security power 
between the President and Congress.  Might there be some distinction 
between the kinds of agencies or powers Congress can insulate from 
Presidential control?  Could Congress insulate executive branch actors in 
their exercise of powers where the President holds some concurrent 
authority with Congress, such as at least some foreign policy or national 
security powers?  Were Congress to seek to insulate certain actors or 
decisionmaking processes from presidential control in areas where the 
President has traditionally asserted Article II authority, such measures could 
bring questions over both the viability of unitary executive theory and the 
allocation of foreign affairs power to a head. 
Congressional attempts to manage the President’s foreign affairs and 
national security decisionmaking therefore could provide the next 
flashpoint at which each of these constitutional questions arise in the 
courts.  This will likely turn on how aggressively Congress seeks to deploy 
process controls to establish formal buffers between the President and 
executive branch decisionmakers in areas where the President has 
traditionally asserted independent or even plenary authority to act. 
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2. Mollification of Congress 
One risk of deploying process controls is that—by giving members of 
Congress a sense that they are controlling the decisionmaking process—this 
may keep them from engaging further in the substance of policymaking.  
And on some matters there is no substitute for direct Congressional—and 
through it public—engagement with the substance of policymaking.   
This phenomenon may be particularly prevalent when Congress 
allocates power vertically down the hierarchy within the executive branch, 
to career professionals who are expected to deploy expertise at a remove 
from partisan interference.  In fact, members of Congress might be more 
reticent to endorse grants of power to the President—in particular to 
Presidents of the opposing party—were they not assured this power would 
be partly wielded (and perhaps tempered) by non-partisan professionals 
within the government.209  And thus congressional delegations of this sort 
should be understood as made in reliance upon existing bureaucratic 
constraints.  I have previously referred to this phenomenon as 
congressional “bargain[ing] in the shadow of the bureaucracy.”210   
Jack Goldsmith and Susan Hennessey nodded toward such a 
phenomenon in their discussion of the reauthorization of FISA 702.211  In 
response to criticism of Democratic lawmakers who voted to reauthorize 
broad surveillance powers to the President while Trump held the office, 
Goldsmith and Hennessey suggest that these members of Congress did so 
only because of their understanding that the powers would be employed 
largely by “career public servants” within agencies that “are remarkably 
immune from inappropriate presidential meddling.”212  But while deference 
to expertise may be reassuring, particularly in highly technical areas or in 
times of high political drama, this ability to push hard decisions to apolitical 
actors may also give Congress a means of abdicating its own responsibility 
to promote informed and public debate. 
Of course, none of this necessarily means that bureaucratic actors can 
easily thwart the will of political leadership.213  A President or other political 
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actor determined to act will often manage to do so if willing to accept the 
political consequences.  And congressional administration of 
decisionmaking inside the executive branch is not a holistic solution to 
Presidential mismanaging of foreign relations.  A President who is willing to 
face the consequences of doing so can generally force the executive branch 
to bend to his will.  With respect to those officials who hold high-level 
positions in the executive branch, like heads of departments and White 
House staffers, the President may appoint whom he chooses, and he may 
order officials beneath him to take, or not take, certain actions. 214  As I 
discuss above, those who decide they cannot follow his orders typically 
resign.215  Or the President may remove recalcitrant officials who refuse his 
directions.216   
There are some process answers to the above problems.  If political 
actors interfere with decisionmaking in a way that upends congressional 
faith in the internal processes they created, members of Congress may turn 
to different process controls, for example by directly requiring the 
involvement of very specific actors—such as with the proposed DETER 
Act.217   
Ultimately, the final constraints on the President’s abuse of 
congressional controls lie outside the executive branch.  They are 
political—such as in response to the firing of officials who insist on 
following congressional requirements against the President’s will, and, to a 
lesser extent, judicial—to the extent the administration refuses to engage a 
reviewable statutory requirement.  Both of these remedies require the other 
branches to step up and engage more directly.  Thus, to the extent 
congressional administration pacifies Congress’s need to act and keeps it 
from engaging further, this is a real threat to oversight of the executive 
branch. 
3. Overeager and Unwilling Deciders 
Much thought about how to structure government rests on 
assumptions that the players are power seeking.218  And Congress’s ability to 
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shift power dynamics inside the executive branch creates avenues for 
internal actors to, in effect, lobby Congress to give them greater 
decisionmaking authority. Executive officials working with Congress to 
push a legislative agenda is itself normal process; much legislation is the 
result of congressional-executive wrangling, and executive branch officials 
regularly seek legislation and work with counterparts in congress to 
accomplish it.219  A request for changes in decision-making authority – 
versus substantive policy – may be based in genuine consideration of the 
best allocation of expertise and resources.  It may also, however, be 
deployed by internal actors who simply want greater power to gain a leg up 
in interagency-conflicts through outside assistance from Congress.  
But not all designations of deciders are the result of requests for more 
power; and not all power is desired.  Many executive officials may not 
always appreciate an allocation of power in their direction.220  A designation 
of decisionmaking authority, even if crafted as one of simple “fact-finding” 
may put the designee in quite an awkward position vis-à-vis her boss, the 
President, or other officials.221  Particularly for executive branch actors who 
view their roles as engaging in fact-finding and analysis, rather than policy-
making, they may view a designation as a policymaker as forcing them to 
act outside of their ordinary mandate.222   
That executive branch officials may not always seek or want policy-
making authority runs counter to the orthodoxy that government officials 
seek to aggrandize power; yet so too does Congress’s slow abdication of 
power over time to the executive branch, contrary to the Madisonian ideal 
of the separate branches as checking one another through their clashing 
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hungers for power.223  And yet here we are.  Government actors do not 
always find that more responsibility, or more power, is necessarily in their 
self interest.224  Whether imposing on these officials despite their reticence 
is in the public interest, however, is another question.  In at least some of 
these cases, it is worth considering that officials given roles that they deem 
to fall outside of their mandate, expertise, or competence may actually be 
right about their mandate, expertise, or competence (or at least the latter 
two, as the first will inevitably shift with the new responsibility).  
Designations of such officials under such circumstances would seem to 
follow from a breakdown in process or a lack of viable alternatives—such 
as a widespread mistrust of the other available officials or the President—in 
which case Congress might be better suited to making the decision itself 
than delegating it to the executive branch at all. 
4. Surreptitious Interference with Political Will 
Presidents, much more so than members of Congress, campaign on 
foreign policy promises.  And there is an expectation on the part of the 
public that they will seek to carry out these promises.  Congressional 
administration may at times permit Congress to stymie presidential 
prerogatives without necessarily doing so openly and entailing the political 
cost of directly challenging the President’s stated policies through 
substantive legislation.  For example, President Obama campaigned on 
closing the military detention facilities at Guantanamo Bay.225  Once he 
began the process of doing so in office, congressional opposition to the 
plan swelled.226  Yet rather than directly legislate that Guantanamo be kept 
open, or prohibit transfers entirely, Congress chose to influence the course 
of Guantanamo closure through less transparent means, by altering the 
transfer decisionmaking process.  By so doing, Congress was able to play a 
large role in upending the President’s closure agenda, for which he might 
have reasonably argued he had a public mandate to accomplish.227  Because 
he, and not Congress, bore the brunt of that failed campaign promise, 
members of Congress who opposed the President politically had political 
incentives to upset his policies generally, regardless of their belief in the 
ideal policy outcome, and particularly so if they could do so with few costs.  
In the case of Guantanamo, it is possible that members of Congress who 
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supported the process controls would have supported more significant 
substantive measures as well, but it is impossible to know whether there 
would have been any political costs borne in that alternative universe.  And 
because the costs to supporting process controls are so low, congressional 
administration could potentially lead to substantive results that neither the 
President nor members of Congress who vote for the control measures 
would support—or would want to be seen supporting—if required to do so 
directly. 
5. Risks to Accountability and Transparency 
Finally, and to my view most significantly, congressional influence 
through process controls in lieu of direct substantive engagement with 
policy can at times weaken, rather than augment, accountability and 
transparency in foreign policy decisionmaking.  In fact, the very same 
political advantages that members of Congress may seek in deploying 
indirect mechanisms of influence rather than more direct forms of policy-
making come hand and hand with concomitant disadvantages to 
transparency and accountability.  The extent to which a given control 
weakens or strengthens accountability and transparency of decisionmaking 
depends on the particular control at issue, how it functions, and the 
plausible alternatives against which it might be measured. 
Arguably, the Constitution allocates to Congress certain powers, such as 
the power to declare war, or to regulate international commerce, at least in 
part because the framers wanted certain types of decisions to be made 
within the context of heavy public debate, by the branch most closely 
accountable to the public.228  Yet in contrast to the substantive control by 
Congress of the merits of a particular policy objective, congressional 
attempts to influence policy by manipulating the inner workings of the 
executive branch, and specifically by designating as the decisionmakers its 
politically-insulated bureaucrats, entail significantly less transparency or 
direct accountability for the substantive positions taken.  This is not to say 
that Congress itself is somehow legislating in secret; its enactment of 
legislative process controls itself is as transparent as would be substantive 
legislation.  But it is the subsequent process of substantive decisionmaking 
by actors inside the executive branch that is more shielded from public 
view or voters’ control.  In fact, that lack of political accountability is often 
the point: whether out of a belief that the decision is better made by 
technocrats without partisan political influence, or because members of 
Congress want to shield themselves from political costs, or both, Congress 
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often deploys process controls in lieu of substance specifically because it sets 
the substantive decision apart from political accountability.229 
The extent to which a given process control engages more or less 
accountability, however, depends on the nature of the control itself, and on 
the baseline against which it is judged.  Process controls may be deployed 
specifically to raise a decision from the ranks of unknown bureaucratic 
actors to a designated high-level official.  Such was the case with the 
Guantanamo certification requirements, in which case Congress’s choice of 
process control took the decisionmaking authority over transfers from an 
unnamed panel of bureaucrats who issued determinations as a group, and 
handed it to a not overjoyed Secretary of Defense for his personal 
signoff.230  In comparison to members of Congress, or the President, the 
unelected Secretary of Defense is less accountable, and certainly does not 
face the voters’ wrath directly unless he later decides to run for elected 
office.  But as compared to decisionmaking by a group of faceless 
bureaucrats, there is more transparency in the decision when made by a 
named high-level official such as the Secretary of Defense.  The many 
accounts by former Secretaries of Defense who reported finding these 
requirements to be a significant, painful burden supports the intuition that 
the direct designation of a decisionmaker does create a sense of 
accountability for one’s decisions.231  As this example demonstrates, the 
specific function the process control implements, and the baseline against 
which it operates, are both critical factors in determine the extent to which 
a given process control aids or weakens accountability.   
Moreover, weighing congressional administration against more direct 
substantive congressional engagement is not necessarily a fair comparison.  
An alternative universe in which Congress legislates substance up to the 
extent of its formal authorities might be one in which foreign policy is more 
accountable to public opinion (putting aside for the moment whether that 
would be a normatively desirable outcome).  But considering Congress’s 
historical trajectory at this point, it is not a realistic one.232  Therefore, while 
it is wise to compare the accountability effect of different types of process 
controls as against one another, it is not typically realistic to compare them 
to direct substantive congressional engagement. 
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Counter-intuitively, the duly elected President is not necessarily a more 
accountable “designated decider” than would be a specific named official in 
his cabinet.  While designating the President as decider might formally 
appear to place the reins in more publicly-accountable hands, the functional 
reality is that President-as-designee does not effectuate the same personal 
accountability features that would any-other-named-official-as-designee.  
This is so for several reasons, among them the fact that the President will 
be held vaguely accountable for all decisions emanating from his term in 
office, whether within or not within his control, and the sheer enormity 
may tend to swallow up any given decision.233  But more importantly for 
our purposes, presidential decisions and pronouncements are often the 
result of processes that take place far below his radar, via group 
decisionmaking by unnamed officials, whom the President and her 
subordinates will often designate and task secretly.234   Thus, neither direct 
congressional engagement with substance nor direct decisions by the 
President are, as a realistic matter, necessarily more “accountable” options 
against which to measure congressional administration.  Instead, specific 
process controls, decisionmaking processes, and their distinct implications 
must be weighed against each other, and against a realistic assessment of 
the plausible alternatives. 
CONCLUSION 
Congressional administration of executive branch decisionmaking 
provides a means for Congress to move past the impasses that often hinder 
direct congressional action in the foreign affairs and national security space.  
The process controls I discuss in this Article permit members of Congress 
to advance policy preferences, push back against a President whose policies 
they mistrust, or resolve politically fraught quandaries by placing them in 
the hands of experts, without many of the policy and political risks that 
often get in the way of substantive legislation.  And yet, despite their 
salience, the influence of process controls on the foreign policy and 
national security decisionmaking process is often absent from debates 
about the allocation of these powers between the President and Congress.  
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The use of process controls to designate deciders within the executive 
branch is particularly effective when it exploits known tensions, which 
provides opportunities for Congress to influence policies through strategic 
use of pressure points on the internal decisional process.  Congress—and 
the Courts, as I will discuss in a future paper—might employ this 
mechanism of oversight even more instrumentally as a means of playing a 
more significant role in national security and foreign relations without 
necessarily infringing on the executive’s comparative advantages of speed, 
expertise, and knowledge, or undermining the United States’ “one voice” in 
foreign affairs.  
Process controls are not a panacea, and they are not without risk.  
Indirect legislation of process is not always superior to direct substantive 
legislation, and the existence of this half measure may at times prevent 
Congress from taking more direct action.  Moreover, process controls entail 
certain risks—to efficient decisionmaking, to accountability, and to public 
engagement with foreign affairs and national security decisions.  Choosing 
the proper control requires consideration of context, purpose, and the state 
of play inside the executive branch.   
Nevertheless, process controls offer three critical advantages to direct 
substantive legislation.  First, they provide a means for members of 
Congress to influence policy without necessarily incurring the political costs 
that often keep them from engaging.  Thus, to the extent congressional 
involvement is important, process controls may often be the only game in 
town.  Second, process controls may be more effective than direct 
mandating of policy, as they act through the commandeering of officials 
inside the executive branch, often before decisions even reach the 
President, rather than through direct interbranch conflict, which the 
President may be more inclined to thwart.  And finally, process controls 
provide a means of Congressional influence on policy while still benefiting 
from the executive branch advantages of information, expertise, and 
dispatch.  Ultimately, process controls can be an important tool Congress 
may and should deploy to push back against the President, giving that 
branch some concrete means to complement the President’s creeping 
claims to unilateral power in the foreign affairs and national security 
spheres. 
